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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 In December 2010, Tarek Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor had set himself 
on fire to protest against the humiliation he suffered on the hands of a woman police officer. 
While the government tried to quell the potential impacts of Bouazizi’s protest, his death served 
as a catalyst to the call for political change. Several Middle Eastern and North African countries 
– such as Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Algeria and Jordan – have been affected by 
the uprisings dubbed as the “Arab Spring”.1  
 With the occurrence of the 2010 Tunisian revolution, the Egyptian opposition groups 
took the opportunity to instigate demonstrations and labor strikes throughout the country to force 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to resign from office.2 As the protests occurred in Egypt and 
in other parts of the Middle East, protesters sought the support of the international community to 
facilitate reform and democracy in the country– especially from the European Union (EU).3 With 
its closeness to the region and the implications of the Arab uprisings to the European nations, it 
is a question as to how the EU contributed to the unleashed political process. 
 
                                                 
1
 Katerina Dalacoura. “The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical 
implications.” International Affairs 88.1 (2012): 63-66. 
2
 Central Intelligence Agency. "Egypt." The World Facebook. October 20, 2015. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html (accessed October 24, 2015). 
3
 W Vandenhole. Child Soldiers and the EU Policy on Children on Armed Conflict. Brussels: TEPSA, 
2014. 
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Statement of the Problem 
 With the onset of the Arab Spring, external actors found themselves caught off guard by 
the democratic uprisings and the implications they hold to their respective national interests in 
the region. For the EU, the instability in the region presents challenges to the long relationship 
the European nations culminated with the Middle East, especially with Egypt. The uprising 
created a situation where the EU had to develop new policies to capitalize on the opportunity for 
democratic change while maintaining the decades long EU’s interest in Egypt. Accordingly, the 
main question this study tries to answer is whether and the extent to which the EU was able to 
adopt the proper policies, particularly whether the EU was able to use the resources at its 
disposal to facilitate democratic change in Egypt.  
The following secondary questions would also be answered throughout the study: 
1. What is the nature of the EU’s foreign policy in terms of its mechanism, limitations, 
major premises and factors influencing its effectiveness?  
2. What is the history of EU-Egyptian partnership prior to the Arab Spring?  
3. Where there any changes to EU-Egyptian relations after the Arab Spring to the 
present?   
4. How does the situation of Tunisia and the EU’s actions in the country differ from the 
EU’s actions in the Egyptian case?  
Hypothesis 
 This study will argue that while the European Union has established several channels that 
would aid Egypt in reemerging from the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU was not able to 
adjust its policies in a way that could have make it more effective to capitalize on Egypt’s 
democratic window of opportunity. Consequently, the EU continued to prioritize its tangible 
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interests over democratization. The political instability in the region, the interests of EU member 
states and the complex nature of the EU’s structure are the reasons for the EU’s failure. The 
guiding hypothesis of this thesis are stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 
 The existing differences in interest and lack of coordination amongst EU member states 
has affected an overall effective EU foreign policy; of which hindered EU institutions from 
promoting democracy in Egypt during the Arab Spring.  
Hypothesis 2 
 The development of an effective policy towards Egypt during the Arab Spring did not 
take place due to the institutional setting and complex structure of the EU.   
Objectives/Significance of the Study 
This study aims to investigate if the European Union as an individual power can promote 
change in regions affected by the Arab Spring, especially democracy. Like other countries 
involved in international issues such as the EU, democracy promotion is a major component of 
their foreign policy. However, the EU often acts in support with US efforts when it comes to the 
resolution of a conflict and recovery of a certain country. Democracy promotion and reform are 
integral elements to the EU’s foreign policy and the researcher hopes to understand if the Union 
can indeed deliver its promises. This study is also important because democracy is often 
considered by the Western powers as the key to Middle Eastern recovery but what do the people 
see over the Western-led programs to achieve this freedom.   
Literature Review 
In recent years, the Middle East has been a hot topic for the international community as 
the political instability in the region has brought immense conflict. The public started rebelling 
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against decades old autocratic regimes present in the region, ushering the beginning of the Arab 
Spring. However, the regimes they are trying to overthrow have fought extensively against 
protesters and paralyzed the entire country in the process. In Egypt, the impact of the Arab 
Spring not only triggered political unrest in the country, but also the political uncertainty as the 
country remained unstable even after the overthrowing of Hosni Mubarak. The international 
community had been involved with the efforts to resuscitate Egypt through the Arab Spring and 
the European Union’s actions have been seen by experts both as a beneficial and controversial in 
nature. This literature review will look in depth to the analysis of various experts with regards to 
the European Union’s involvement with the Arab Spring, especially in the issue of Egypt.  
Like the United States, the EU is supportive over the actions of protesters in fighting for 
democracy in Egypt. The EU made itself serve as an impartial mediator, sending emissaries 
consistently in the region to ensure that negotiations can be brokered in a neutral environment. It 
uses diplomatic pressure to ensure governments would agree to the dialogues set by negotiations, 
approving funding to ensure targets are met for reform to flourish.4 Various external policy 
objectives or instruments such as political, economic and military means were used by the Union 
in various degrees and the Union had also used civilian policing and judicial instruments to 
sustain its policies. In terms of its foreign policy, the Union uses diplomacy extensively to ensure 
that continuous dialogue between the Union and the developing country is sustained. The EEAS 
is an integral actor in utilizing continuous diplomacy between the Union and other nations. 
Economic policy instruments are used by the Union in terms of its foreign assistance programs. 
Military and civilian instruments are used in several critical events worldwide to ensure that 
                                                 
4
 Richard Youngs. From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed. (Brussels: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2014): 12. 
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political and economic policy instruments are usable by the Union to establish relations with 
recipient countries. When the Lisbon Treaty was introduced, a clear framework to the EU’s actor 
capability was highlighted to ensure policy instruments are used without issues by the member 
countries.5  
The EU immediately adjusted its policies in the first phase of the Arab Spring; but they 
knew that they cannot direct the tide to their intentions. Instead, the EU redirected its position to 
mirror the intentions of the Arab protestors. They also believed that sustainable stability must be 
restored in Egypt and in the Arab region. The EU’s positions were clearly stated under the 
“Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” and later 
on, “A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood”, highlighting that the EU would actively 
support ongoing democratic transition processes.6 The EU also highlights three priorities when it 
comes to supporting democratic transition. The first priority deals with deep democracy, which 
would restore human rights freedoms and democracy. The EU also pledges to build people 
partnerships to boost civil society development and ensure they will be involved in the 
establishment of the new European Neighborhood Policy between the EU and Egypt. Finally, the 
EU also assures that they will aid Egypt’s efforts to promote inclusive growth and sustainable 
development to ensure that democracy would run deep and ensure active participation from the 
                                                 
5
 Bretherton & Vogler.” 385-386. 
6
 Ivo Iliev, Gabriela Tabakova, Ivan Nikov, Mariela Koycheva, Krasimir Yankov, and Ralitza Trifonova. 
European neighborhood policy- a new attitude towards the "Southern neighbors". (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
2012): 10-13. 
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public.7 Aside from these two policies, the EU also introduced the “3 Ms” in ensuring that 
reform and progress can be sent to the region through the EU’s assistance. These three M’s – 
Money, Mobility and Markets – would ensure the recovery of affected Arab countries by the 
Arab Spring and ensure the creation of new opportunities for progress to develop in the country. 
It is also expected that these three M’s would also open civil society participation and 
development to flourish, while helping businesses to get funding.8  
 In comparison to the policies stressed by the EU, the individual members of the EU had 
also expressed their own intentions with regards to their involvement in the Arab Spring. The 
positions of these individual member countries influences EU’s overall policies in the region, 
mostly highlighting these member country’s national interests and regional priorities in the 
region. 9 The United Kingdom, for example, sees Egypt as a key partner for the success of the 
Middle East Peace Process alongside Sudan and Iran. Egypt is also seen as a buffer against 
extremist in the region and a key commercial partner of Britain. With the onset of the Arab 
Spring, Britain had immediately increased dialogue between key Egyptians leaders and 
protesters, calling for democratic elections.10 On the other hand, for France, it intended to use the 
                                                 
7
 Timo Behr. After the Revolution: The EU and the Arab Transition. Policy Paper No. 54, (Paris: Notre 
Europe, 2012): 8-10. 
8
 European Commission. "The EU's response to the 'Arab Spring'." European Commission Press Release 
Database. December 16, 2011. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-918_en.htm (accessed October 5, 
2015). 
9
 Elena Lazarou, Maria Gianniou, and Gerasimos Tsourapas. "The Limits of Norm Promotion: The EU in 
Egypt and Israel/Palestine." Insight Turkey 15, no. 2 (2013): 179.  
10
 British Parliament; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. British Foreign Policy and the 
'Arab Spring': Second Report of Session 2012-13. (London: The Stationery Office, 2012): 67. 
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situation as a means to boost France’s position as the leader of the EU and lead the efforts in 
pushing for change in the region. However, France’s realpolitik policies in the region was not 
able to hold firmly, especially after Hosni Mubarak – an ally of France - was ousted in 2011. In a 
statement after the protests, President Nicolas Sarkozy admitted that he underestimated the 
significance of these protests and highlighted the necessity to revising EU policies in the region. 
11 
During the period of the Arab Spring in Egypt and after the interim governments were 
put in place, experts have been divided with regards to the impact brought in by EU involvement 
and the extent of EU policies. The EU has regularly sent emissaries and its top leaders like 
European Commission President Barroso and European Council President Van Rompuy in Egypt 
to support continuous movements for democracy and human rights. The Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP) published on March 8th, 2011 also highlighted the 
EU’s initial policy response to the Arab Spring and how democracy and human rights protection 
would be attained through the improvement of civil society groups. Although there is a flexible 
clause on how the PfDSP would be applied for civil society improvement, its effectiveness is 
challenged by the document itself because it did not clearly define who are the ‘social partners’ 
and ‘civil society’ that should be supported.12 The Morsi government had immediately resumed 
talks with the EU with the creation of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement and the 
development of the ENP Action Plan. The EEAS had also sent electoral experts to ensure that 
                                                 
11
 Barah Mikail. France and the Arab Spring: an opportunistic quest for influence. Working Paper No. 
110, (Madrid: Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), 2011): 5.  
12
 Andrea Teti. "Democracy without Social Justice: Marginalization of Social and Economic Rights in EU 
Democracy Assistance Policy after the Arab Spring." Middle East Critique 24, no. 1 (2015): 12-20.  
12 
 
the Egyptian Elections of 2012 will be in accordance to democratic standards and held fairly 
without interruptions. The EU has also offered to send in an EU Election Observation Mission 
(EOM) should the Egyptian government seek their assistance. Financially, the EU has opened 
449 million euros for 2011-2013. Further financial pledges were also offered by the EIB and 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) amounting to 5 billion euros, the 
SPRING Programme meant for socio-economic reform offered 90 million euros and 163 million 
euros would be offered by the Neighborhood Investment Facility. The EU has also agreed with 
the Egyptian government to to further establish a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement 
to ensure economic reform in the country.13  
Despite these proposals and aid reliefs, experts believe there is a necessity to review its 
current partnerships and programs in Egypt. First, considerations on the political balance in the 
country must be considered as President Morsi’s policies are pragmatic, but somehow unstable.14 
Although he had been vocal at first in continuing EU-Egyptian relations in order to resuscitate 
the country, the Egyptian political environment remained unstable due to Morsi’s declarations 
that restricted opposition towards his control.15 
                                                 
13
 European Commission. "EU's response to the "Arab Spring": The State-of-Play after Two Years." 
European Commission Press Release Database. February 8, 2013. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
81_en.htm (accessed October 5, 2015). 
14
 Timo Behr, and Aaretti Siitonen. Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil Society Engagement after 
the Arab Spring. FIIA Working Paper No. 77, (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2013): 15. 
15
 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, the EU remains divided as to how they can unify their foreign policy 
towards these ailing countries.16  There were experts stressing that the EU’s revisions of its 
foreign policy  were not done in preparation of their actions towards Egypt, but it was done out 
of bureaucracy. It is said that that the EU no longer had a clear goal and intent in changing its 
Southern neighbors, especially after the failed 2010 elections.17 
There is also the issue of Egypt’s continuous economic problems, thus the need for the 
EU’s policies to be economic-centered.18 It is also noted by experts that the EU must ensure that 
their policies in Egypt are stronger similar to their actions in Tunisia, pressuring the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces to deliver democracy.19 Further assurances must also be done to 
ensure that EU incentives are delivered in the region which would catch the attention and support 
of the donor countries. The lack of clear protocols and benefits Egypt will gain from EU’s 
assistance causes them – and other Arab countries – to turn down any potential negotiations with 
the EU regarding EU’s Action Plans.20 Currently, it is notable that while Europe’s assistance in 
the region does present opportunities for change and development in the region, it is uncertain as 
                                                 
16
 Kristyn Greco. "The Arab Spring: Where Was the EU, and What is its Future Role in the Region?" Jean 
Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 13, no. 4 (2013): 5-6.  
17
 Vera van Hullen. EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring: International Cooperation and 
Auhoritarianism. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian, 2015, 134.  
18
 Vanda Amaro Dias. "A Critical Analysis of the EU's Response to the Arab Spring and its Implications 
for EU Security." Perspectives on European Society and Politics, no. 1 (2014): 50.  
19
 Daniela Huber. "Mixed Signals" Still? The EU's Democracy and Human Rights Policy Since the 
Outbreak of the Arab Spring. IAI Working Papers 12, (Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali, 2012): 5-6.  
20
 Richard Youngs. The EU and the Arab spring: from munificence to geo-strategy. Policy Brief no. 100, 
(Madrid: Fudacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2011): 2-4.  
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to whether or not it would strengthen the possibility of agreements to hold. 21 Experts also argue 
that should in case these transitioning countries fait to recover, Europe would have to face the 
security threats that would be brought by immigration, especially when returning migrants to the 
country.22  
 The ineffective EU policies in Egypt makes a point of agreement among most scholars 
and observers. Some evidence suggests that policies were attempted but failed, while others 
simply suggest false flags on the part of EU institutions and member states in attempting to 
provide any real help. Hollis uses primary evidence or reference points by EU institutions, which 
admit to failure in the region.23 She refers to ‘EC High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy’ statements that admit to revisions needed to policies in Egypt. Hollis 
also cited inefficiency in the EEAS in keeping up with the changing Egyptian political 
environment. Vivien Pertusot added that the failure of the EU institutions was also attributed to 
its incapacity to coordinate with its member countries which prolonged their collective action to 
the Egyptian crisis. Each institution also varied on how the EU should act towards Egypt. 24 
                                                 
21
 Michelle Pace, and Peter Seeberg. The European Union's Democratization Agenda in the 
Mediterranean. (London: Routledge, 2013): 121-122.  
22
 Micheline Ishay. "The spring of Arab nations? Paths toward democratic transition." Philosophy and 
Social Criticism, 2013: 9-10.  
23
 Rosemary Hollis. "No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 'Arab Spring'." 
International Affairs 88, no. 1 (2012): 87-89.  
24
 Vivien Pertusot. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue: Europe's Response to the Egyptian Uprising." Carnegie 
Europe. May 27, 2011. http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=44230 (accessed November 10, 2015). 
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This offers an interesting perspective as Pertusot and Hollis’ opinions are drawn from EU 
rhetoric, as opposed to a more analytical perspective offered by Behr. 25 His argument suggests 
that EU foreign policy failure in Egypt originated from a handful of European states setting EU 
foreign policy, as the Union as a whole, was more entrenched in the handling of the global 
financial crisis.26 It is unique how both scholars, along with the likes of Rosa Balfour, do agree 
that policy was set purely in favor of individual bilateral relations between member states and 
Egypt; working to benefit leading EU member states. Balfour; however, does go on to suggest 
though that this was a result of the ever growing competition for dominance of resources in the 
region between the US and EU member states.27 We must be vigilant in the knowledge that this 
level of competition put mutual efforts in place between Europe and the US to secure mutually 
beneficial sources; while on the other hand ,creating a form of state-level competition. What is 
meant by this is the individual economic competition between the likes of Germany and the US, 
as well as Germany and France, to name but a few outside of EU institutions and establishments.  
 Pierre Vimont argues that the complex institutional setting of the EU framework for 
policy making generally hinders the EU ability to develop effective foreign policy. He claims 
that EU member states have no framework or criteria for foreign policy-making. Therefore, the 
‘added value’ brought by EU foreign policy has never really been felt, but much rather based on 
the achievements of individual member states away from EU institutions.28  
                                                 
25
 Behr. "The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change its 
Spots?" Amsterdam Law Forum (2012). 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Balfour. Changes and Continuities in EU-Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring. 31-34. 
28
 Pierre Vimont. “The Path to an Upgraded EU Foreign Policy.” (Brussels: Carnegie Europe, 2015). 
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 Given that EU foreign policy during the Arab Spring was to advance democracy, in much 
the same way they preached all over Europe, the tools they disposed upon the Arab region 
suggest otherwise by scholars. Rosa Balfour’s perspective is a stance of pragmatism, in that she 
isolates humanitarian assistance; military assistance by NATO forces also affiliated within the 
EU, as well as economic support, analyze as points for review of the issue; based on these 
pragmatic tools actually being carried out after the Arab Spring.29 Her analysis suggests that 
these tools either did not go far enough, to bring any real change to the region; or were in fact 
counterproductive and served only to benefit strong states in the EU and their own foreign 
policies.30 Case in point being the use of the EU to achieve specific access to resources following 
the Arab Spring, by using NATO forces to overthrow General Gaddafi in Libya; despite the 
legality of the operation being questionable. This contrasts with the expressions of Jon Marks 
who portrays the EMP, since its induction, all the way through the UFM and onwards, as to be 
the actual points of analysis to refer to for EU foreign policy tools in the region.31 His argument 
portrays these key methods as a way for the EU to tackle the worsening migration problem in 
Europe, through a questionable development policy in the Arab region, which covers up true 
intentions; serving to only cover areas in the economy, border security, and even constitutionally 
to repel migrant movements into Europe.  
 Hollis, on the other hand, again examines the rhetoric of the EU in exemplifying their 
successful exportation of democracy throughout Eastern Europe following the collapse of Soviet 
                                                 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Jon Marks. ‘High hopes and low motives: the New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative.’ 
Mediterranean Politics 1, no. 1 (1996): 1-24. 
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Satellite states. 32  Again, she does the job of balancing a positive and negative opinion by 
showing that the EU had a more successful record, especially in economic senses, in the Arab 
region, if compared with other external actors, such as the Americans or non-European NATO 
states. On the other hand, she does hold strong criticism for the credibility of the ENP. All source 
analyzed from a critical perspective, express the ENP as nothing more than a means of advancing 
EU individual member states own respective policies, rather than achieving the claims they set 
out to be of mutual benefit; securing a strong baring for the hypothesis on EU member states 
interfering in the ability of EU institutions to do the required job.  
 Again, Vimont additionally critiques the structure of the EU, in so far that it leads its 
decisions and toolbox on the powers originally given to the Union by its treaties and by the 
decisions of EU constitutional judges, therefore not allowing EU institutions responsible with 
issues of foreign policy to have all capabilities at their disposal.33  
This lack of framework for dialogue amongst EU member state is furthered by Timo 
Behr34, who acknowledges the existence of tension or the lack of agreement between essentialist 
and contigencist interpretations of political Islam from within the EU and among member states, 
as a basic example in post revolution relations with the region. As a result of this, Behr argues 
that a bi-polar stance exists from within the EU, leading to an effective and ever-changing set of 
policies being put in place. Furthermore, he argues that this has led to conflicting policies by 
                                                 
32
 Hollis. "No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 'Arab Spring'.": 87-89. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Timo Behr. "The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard 
Change its Spots?" Amsterdam Law Forum 4, no. 2 (2012): 79. 
18 
 
member states within their bilateral relations. 35  His reference focuses heavily on the 
interpretations of Political Islam from within the EU in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.  
Conceptual Framework 
The EU’s foreign policy is influenced by various factors that affects the continuity of its 
functions and changes the level of its effectiveness: presence (EU’s international reputation and 
expectations to EU’s actions), opportunity (external environment) and capability (internal 
factors).36 These three factors make the analytical framework applied in this thesis.  
Presence/ International Image 
Presence involves the ability of one actor to exert its influence and for the EU, this meant 
a combination of the EU’s identity and the impacts of its internal policies. The EU is often 
considered as “community of security and prosperity”, allowing it to gain the cooperation of 
other nations supporting the ideals of the Union.37 With the cooperation of other nations, it 
increases EU’s presence in the international community and call for further cooperation. The 
presence of the EU in the global arena has been sustained by its internal achievements since the 
establishment of the customs union and the single market. The growing EU ‘s capabilities serves 
as a magnet for the Union to accumulate partners whom wish to gain benefits from the Union’s 
resources. 38   
                                                 
35
 Ibid.   
36
 Charlotte Bretherton, and John Vogler. "A global actor past its peak?" International Relations 27, no. 3 
(2013): 376.  
37
 Bretherton & Vogler.” A global actor past its peak?” 377 
38
 Bretherton & Vogler.” 377-378.  
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According to the article of Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, prior to the onset of the 
Arab Spring in Egypt and other Arab nations, the EU was considered one of the pioneers of 
international human rights protections and democracy promotion after the United States. In light 
of this image, the EU had introduced various instruments to sustain its democracy promotion and 
human rights programs worldwide through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR-I) program. Under the program, the EU allocates funds meant for the 
improvement of human rights and democracy promotion in recipient countries. However, even 
before the Arab Spring, several reviews were done by the EU regarding the effectiveness of the 
EIDHR-I where problems have been indicated.39  
By the time the Arab Spring occurred in Egypt, Andrea Teti stated that the EU still 
maintained its stance in protecting human rights and democracy promotion. The Union retained 
the conceptual framework which was used under the EIDHR-I, stressing that their action in 
Egypt and other Arab nations represents an innovation on how external relations can be done. 40  
Opportunity/ external environment 
 Opportunity, on the other hand, refers to the external environment that influences foreign 
action. The external environment could mean the onset of events that opens the possibility for 
EU involvement. Globalization and the initial isolationist policies  of the administration of 
George W. Bush, including the withdrawal of the United States in 2000 from the negotiations 
regarding the Kyoto Protocol are some of the instances where the EU stepped as the global 
                                                 
39
 “The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries” in 
2001 (COM (2001) 252).  
40
 Andrea Teti. "Democracy without Social Justice: Marginalization of Social and Economic Rights in EU 
Democracy Assistance Policy after the Arab Spring." Middle East Critique 24, no. 1 (2015): 12-20.  
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leader.41 In the case of the Arab Spring in Egypt, the EU’s foreign policy was challenged by the 
domestic politics of Egypt which remained unstable, generating conflicting demands on external 
actors, and defied external influence.42 
Capability/ Internal factors 
 Finally, the EU’s foreign policy effectiveness and continuity is also influenced by the 
internal factors that redefines the capability of the EU’s foreign policy. Experts often highlight 
that the EU’s foreign or external action/inaction is determined by its capability on formulating 
policy and utilize various policy instruments to enforce these policies. In terms of policy 
formulation, the EU’s policies are often influenced by three factors: coherence between levels of 
policy-making, coherence between policy sectors, and institutional coherence between EU 
institutions. The impact of these coherence issues vary in severity depending on the policy area 
in question with foreign and security policy included in the ‘sensitive’ areas that has greater 
importance when it comes to how these three factors affect EU’s external policy. Under the 
problem of coherence between levels of policy making, member states’ interests play role in 
establishing foreign policy because while these member countries can support EU action, many 
would prefer to continue old relations with countries they have long relations such as former 
colonies.43 The influence of the member countries differ in nature in the EU’s foreign policy 
capability because of six major factors: entry date, size, wealth, state structure, economic 
ideology and integration preferences. When it comes to foreign policy, the size, state structure 
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and attitude towards integration preferences influence how the member countries develop their 
policies towards the particular developing countries. 44 
Three member countries of the EU also influence the nature of its foreign policy and 
redirects the policies to match their respective foreign policies. Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom. Although there are other big member states, these three are generally perceived as 
global actors due to their permanent membership in UN Security Council (UK and France) and 
their position in the global economy. Collectively, the Big Three represent 40% of the EU’s total 
population and a half of the EU’s GDP. The three countries also possess the largest share of 
military expenditures and provide over 40% of the EU’s diplomats.45  
EU foreign policy is also influenced by coherence between policy sectors such as trade, 
environment, and energy. With the multi-level nature of the EU, coherence between policy 
sectors is often difficult to achieve. Finally, coherence between the EU’ internal policy 
coordination through its institutions also play a role in the capacity of EU foreign policy. Several 
of the policies and programs which were created by the EU to ensure integration between all 
institutions of the Union are fluid in terms of policy coherence such as the Cardiff Process in 
1998.46 
 The factors under policy formation in the case of Egypt can be seen in various parts of 
the Crisis. In the case of coherence between policy-making levels, each member country had 
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their respective positions with regards to how the EU should react. The Big Three – Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom – for example, defined their own version of EU action on 
January 29, 2011 without considering the EU’s overall stance in the issue.47 There was also a 
lack of support from the EU member countries when it comes to the enactment of the revisions 
for the ENP as some members were against continuous EU-Mediterranean relations while others 
pressed their national interests in dealing with the region.  48 
 
Methodology 
 In order to analyze the arguments properly regarding the EU’s actions in the Egypt 
throughout the Arab Spring and its aftermath, this study utilized content analysis and a case 
study. Content analysis is one of the major tools used in political science research and the perfect 
research method to interpret the documents from the EU and its member countries throughout the 
duration of the crisis. This research method will also be able to permit the researcher to verify the 
facts. The case study, on the other hand, is also utilized by this researcher to provide a brief 
analysis of two different countries and indicate their similarities and differences. For this study, a 
case study is used to determine the nature of the EU-Egyptian relations before, during and after 
the Arab Spring and highlight the similarities and differences it has over another country which 
the EU has been involved with, such as Tunisia. The case study would also provide the 
researcher and the researchers an overview with regards to the nature of the entire crisis.  
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CHAPTER II: THE NATURE OF EU FOREIGN POLICY 
 This chapter discusses the nature of EU’s foreign policy and the EU’s intentions of 
expanding its international presence. A thorough explanation of the region’s foreign policy 
objectives and mechanisms will be included alongside its limitations and restrictions. The EU’s 
democracy promotion would also be discussed. The EU’s effectiveness as an international actor 
is also discussed, with a brief discussion of its actions in Tunisia throughout the Arab Spring will 
also be included to highlight similarities or differences in the EU’s actions in Egypt.  
Mechanisms of the EU’s foreign policy 
 The EU’s foreign policy mechanism is quite complex as it has a multifaceted system that 
divides EU’s foreign policy into different levels. This multifaceted system of the EU takes into 
consideration two different treaties: The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The TEU includes the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), highlighting the 
influence of the member countries in terms of developing the EU’s foreign policy through the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers. The TFEU, on the other hand, comprises the 
“Community method” wherein the Council of the EU, the Commission, the European Parliament 
(EP) and the Court of justice tackles majority voting regarding external policies of the Union.  
However, it is observed that the EU does not always adhere to the premises of the 
Treaties when it comes to foreign policy, especially depending on the foreign policy issue in 
question. The national and the EU level actors play a key role in developing EU’s foreign policy, 
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ensuring that the national level remains influential in EU institutions while the EU’s policies are 
applied by the member states. Foreign policy is also influenced by the international context 
through the organizations and alliances done by either the EU or the member countries. As a 
result, all of the Union’s foreign policy is done in conjunction with other organizations and the 
organization’s initiatives.  The EU foreign policy also showcases the presence of national foreign 
policy despite the presence of a common foreign and security policy that would unite the EU’s 
member countries on foreign policy. As signatories to the TEU, member states are expected to 
adhere to the CFSP. However, with the creation of the Lisbon Treaty’s Declarations 13 and 14, 
member countries have the power to influence EU’s foreign policy.49  
Goals of the EU foreign policy 
 The EU’s foreign policy is not always influenced by external objectives which has the 
capacity influence the external environment, but it is also influenced by their internal objectives. 
The EU’s internal objectives can be classified into three categories: interrelational objectives, 
integration objectives and identity objectives. Interrelational objectives often consider the mutual 
relations of each member country influenced by the Union’s intentions on integrating its member 
states in one group. After the Second World War, European integration was one of the major 
concerts of the Union to improve relations between European states and create a medium 
wherein countries can achieve their national interests without resorting to war. Considering this 
intentions, the EU’s foreign policy is designed to promote diplomacy to prevent conflict between 
member countries especially on issues on foreign policy. This framework is also designed to 
ensure that mutual understanding between countries can be achieved. However, this also means 
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that member countries can opt out from supporting or resolving a specific foreign policy within 
the EU framework because it may cause further conflict between member countries.  
 Aside from interrelational objectives, the EU’s foreign policy also takes into 
consideration internal objectives that would boost not just the European integration initiative, but 
also influence how Europe can grow as a united region. Member states can adopt foreign policies 
that would match this objective, proving to the rest of the world that the EU is a group that 
legitimizes their unity and create a collective identity that unites each member country. Of 
course, member states’ support in this level may vary depending on the foreign policy issues that 
may influence their own national interests. These objectives also showcase that each member 
state and its actors have high expectations with the EU’s capacity and show their capacity in 
influencing the EU’s foreign policy.  
 Aside from these objectives, additional objectives are highlighted by the TEU and the 
TFEU that supports the EU’s foreign policy. Under the TEU, the international action of the EU is 
based on the virtues that has designed its inception. Article 21(2) of the TEU also adds that the 
EU aims to ensure that its values, national interest, security concerns, and integrity through its 
foreign policy. The EU also aims to prevent conflicts and preserve peace in various regions in 
order to strengthen the capacity of international security worldwide. The Union also wishes to 
aid the development of sustainable development in developing countries which is currently 
having issues on stopping the growth of poverty. They also hope to introduce trade unions and an 
active participation of all nations in the world market. The TEU also highlights the intentions of 
the EU to boost environmental protection and better aid and humanitarian efforts worldwide. 
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Finally, the TEU also highlights that the EU also aims to use its foreign policy to promote a 
stronger international system that has active cooperation from all states.50  
Limitations and Restrictions of the EU’s foreign policy 
 However, the foreign policy of the EU has three major limitations that restricts their 
actions in the international community. The first limitation the foreign policy has is the issue on 
task expansion. As the EU continues to expand, the EU has to consider how to integrate the new 
government within its complex framework. Prior to the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 
had more than 40,000 diplomats and took over 1,500 missions. However, while these diplomats 
ensured that the EU had a presence in these countries, it was difficult to initiate foreign programs 
as no government or minister can issue orders for these diplomats. Further issues were also 
caused by the fragmented infrastructure in Brussels where the EU headquarters is located. Upon 
the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), the High Representative was given the power to order the EEAS and monitor 
the activities of the EU diplomatic corps worldwide.    
 Aside from the problems in task expansion, another critical limitation in the EU’s foreign 
policy is its incapacity in uniting the Community into one cohesive unit when it comes to 
political and economic programs and positions. Normally, the European Union has the capacity 
to deal with ‘low’ politics or domestic politics that would ensure that issues such as economics, 
trade and common monetary policy would be supported by all member countries. In terms of 
trade, for example, the Community method of decision-making is used to establish the policy and 
provides power to the Union’s infrastructure. The EU also flourished as one of the leaders in aid 
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and development policy and environmental diplomacy. However, when it comes to ‘high 
politics’ or issues pertaining to traditional diplomacy, the Union is unable to speak as one unit. 
Although the members of the EU are signatories to the Maastricht Treaty that introduced the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), there is still no common and singular foreign 
policy that would replace national foreign policies completely. It is also difficult for the EU to 
launch the CFSP because it needs intergovernmental consensus that would allow the EU to stand 
in for the member countries and member country support.  
 Finally, the EU is also limited and restricted in movement because of the expectations of 
the world regarding the capacity of the EU in fulfilling its targets and supporting their actions. 
Since the end of the Cold War, EU foreign policy-makers had exaggerated the capacity of the 
region’s foreign policy and stressed that the Union can respond to issues faster than other 
countries. However, for the past two decades, the EU’s narrative of being an effective global 
actor waned to the point they still are not considered as a major global power by the rest of the 
globe. In one statement, former EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten stated that 
Europe can be considered as a good support to the US when it comes to supporting the resolution 
of world issues and they can also be effective when it comes to solving problems close to the 
region like the issue in the Balkans 51 
Democracy Promotion of the EU 
 It is also under the EU’s foreign policy initiatives that it also aims to promote democracy 
in an international level. According to Article 21(1) of the TEU, the EU’s international stance is 
influenced by core objectives and principles that highlight the Union’s values: 
                                                 
51
 John Peterson. (2012). The EU as a Global Actor. In E. Bomberg, J. Peterson, & R. Corbett, The 
European Union: How does it work? (pp. 203-223). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 207-208.  
28 
 
“The Union’s actions on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of 
equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law.”52 
 The EU’s intentions on spreading the growth of democracy holds merits as many experts 
have indicated that the region has been the most successful in promoting democracy and human 
rights worldwide. Prior to the creation of the EU, Germany had led the region’s initiatives in 
promoting democracy through the creation of training and seminar workshops that would 
introduce democracy. Political parties in the period even created international offices in order to 
support the democracy programs. British political parties also supported democracy development 
in the region and the government has provided funding for most of these efforts. When the EU 
had been established, it slowly incorporated the ideas by its member countries on how it can 
introduce democracy to their newest member countries and accession countries. This was 
important considering that the EU had processed the expansion of the Union to former 
communist nations in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 Aside from the premises of the TEU, further efforts by the EU to improve its democracy 
promotion in its foreign policy was done through the improvement of its development assistance 
programs in 2005. The European Council adopted a resolution that would call new member 
states to contribute 0.17 percent of their gross national income to the Union’s development 
assistance program by 2010 and later on, contribute 0.33 percent by 2015. Although the 
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percentage of the contributed funds of the member states were very modest, the active 
participation of each member state to the initiative shows that the EU has now grown as a 
significant actor in foreign assistance. Many member states had highlighted that these foreign 
assistance contributions are for the introduction of democracy and human rights. Democracy and 
human rights had also been the prime focus of European Commission President Jose Manuel 
Barroso as he even introduced new institutions and programs to ensure that these democracy 
assistance funds and services are delivered to nations needing their support. Currently, the EU is 
even considered as the world’s largest foreign aid donor.  
 One of the programs introduced and used by the Commission for democracy assistance is 
EuropeAid. Under the program’s main mandate, EuropeAid’s functions are the following:  
“The Commission’s support to democratization pursues both a top-down and bottom-up 
approach. This includes democratic institution building, such as capacity building of 
parliaments and local governments, electoral support and observation, reform and 
training of the judiciary, and anti-corruption measures. It also covers civil society 
programs, including projects supporting non-state actors in their advocacy, information 
and education activities in the areas of human rights and democracy, as well as lobbying 
to secure political change or to monitor the actions of public institutions.” 
Aside from the EuropeAid, the EU also uses the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights program as a means to deliver assistance to recipient countries. The program has 
an annual budget of 140 million euros that would be used for the improvement of civil society 
organizations that would lead in democracy development in the country. The funding also 
supports EU’s election monitoring programs around the globe. The EU also uses the funds to 
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assist in stopping programs like capital punishment and violence and support organizations like 
the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.53  
However, some critics indicated that EU’s democracy promotion is quite vague in nation 
despite the fact it is considered one of the leaders in democracy promotions worldwide. The 
Union remains divided over the creation of a European Consensus on Democracy which would 
highlight a unified definition on democracy for the entire Union. Elements on what kind of 
democracy the Union also tries to pursue is very vague, even in some of its programs such as the 
EU Strategic Framework and the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. When the EU 
included the Central and Eastern European countries, there were inconsistencies on how the EU 
can introduce democracy in these countries now that they are a part of the EU. It is essential that 
the EU resolves this issue because it would prevent its effectiveness in promoting democracy.54  
EU’s Image in the International Arena 
 When it comes to the EU’s status in the international community, it has a very varied 
relation with the several members of the international community depending on their 
specialization and policies. The EU either takes a full membership participation when it comes to 
international organization or an observer status, depending on the policies supported by the 
organization. For example, the EU is only an observer in the International Labor Organization. 
However, if there are instances where the EU is prevented from taking part of international 
organizations, the EU retains some semblance of presence through their Member States. 
Although some Member States can be reluctant over representing the EU, these member 
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countries are expected to represent the organization especially if the Union holds immense 
influence in an issue domain as part of their cooperation. After the Lisbon Treaty was enforced, 
several provisions were listed by the treaty when it comes to the Union’s stance in international 
organizations and it is the High Representative who represent the Union in the international 
community. 55   
EU Foreign Policy in Effect: Tunisia 
 Like other Mediterranean countries, the EU and Tunisia have shared a very long 
relationship that enabled the EU to retain a semblance of presence in the country. Tunisia is a 
signatory to the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) which was established 
under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and political dialogue began between Tunisia 
and the EU in 1998. There were issues when it came to the negotiations with the country due to 
the quality and content of the dialogue as noted by the Association Council meetings between the 
EU and Tunisia. Tunisia also restricted some movement for the democracy promotion in the 
region with the EU because of meeting postponements and political dissonance as seen in 2005 
and 2007. The EU was also unable to commit to new programs with Tunisia for democratic 
reform since 2005 due to the complications of imposing earlier projects raised under the MEDA 
and the EIDHR program. However, there were analysis stressing that EU-Tunisia partnership in 
establishing democracy promotion in the country from the 1990s to 2005 had failed because of 
little democracy assistance programs in the first place and the limited quality of projects.56  
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When Tunisia had requested an upgrade with their bilateral relations with the EU after 
the Union granted advanced status for Morocco in 2008. The EU had boosted its negotiations 
with the country to suggest improvements in Tunisia’s human rights programs. However, the EU 
showed contradictions when it comes to its actions because it had delayed negotiations with 
Tunisia and the Commission was set in setting a very strict political reform set for the country. 
Although the EU did promise in 2009 that they will work on negotiations with Tunisia, the EU-
Tunisia Association Council did not meet in 2009. It was only in 2010 did the EU and Tunisia 
negotiating parties meet to discuss the proposals submitted earlier in the year.57 Negotiations 
were put on hold when the protests began in December 2010 and the EU had taken until January 
10, 2011 to release an official statement regarding the protests. In the EU’s official statement, 
they only called for restraint and called for the Tunisian government to release the activists. On 
January 14, 2011, the EU welcomed Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s announcement that he will not 
take part in the electoral campaigns in 2014 while the public denounced the Ben Ali regime for 
the massacre of over 60 demonstrators in the country. The EU also supported the Tunisian 
government’s announcement that they will no longer use live rounds against protesters, and the 
Union would still continue talks with Tunisia to improve relations to “advanced status” despite 
the brutality of the government towards protesters. The Union – through the joint statement of 
HR/VP Ashton and Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Commissioner Stefan Fuele – did 
stress they will include human rights protections in their discussions with Tunisia. Critics such as 
the left-wing, Liberal and Green MEPs had opposed the EU’s delayed actions to the killings, 
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favoring on improving EU-Tunis relations first then putting human rights protections second in 
the negotiations.58 
A positive support from the EU was only stressed when Ben Ali departed Tunisia, 
stressing that they will support democracy promotion in the country. Observers also did highlight 
that the EU’s actions in Tunisia still needs improvement, and stronger action should be done 
considering the delay in EU’s response regarding the issue. According to Emelie Doromzee of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, the EU should stop negotiations with Tunisia 
and strongly condemn the Tunis action towards the people. In her statement, Doromzee stated 
that: 
“Until now, the language has been so far from what one would expect and sees 
elsewhere. The EU has put out a very weak statement. It is past the stage of written 
statements. It is almost a month now that these protests have been going on. We need 
concrete actions from the EU.”59 
Aside from the subdued reaction of the EU upon the crisis, the EU member countries 
presented problems with the EU’s actions to press for reform because some of them supported 
the Ali regime. France, for example, supported to Ben Ali by offering to dispatch the riot police 
to help Ben Ali’s government to stop the protests. Southern European countries were also against 
a strong worded sanctions because of the possible influx of immigrants to their countries if 
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sanctions are imposed in Tunisia.60 Euromed and other independent bodies named France, Italy, 
Malta, and Spain in support of Doromzee’s analysis and indicated that these four countries 
influence EU Council policies on EU action towards Tunisia and other northern autocracies. 
Euromed Human Rights Network Coordinator Matthieu Routier stressed, after his visit to 
Tunisia and Algeria, that the EU member states should be worried about regards to Tunisia 
because unless intervention is done, human rights and further political instability will continue to 
worsen in the next coming days.61 
Concluding Remarks 
The EU’s foreign policy features a very complex mechanism that takes into consideration 
its history and the values that had brought to its inception. Every member country has a 
contribution to the creation of the EU’s foreign policy and the EU aims to design its actions 
based on these member country’s interests. However, given the complex nature of the EU’s 
membership and its overall influence, there is an issue when it comes to ensuring that their 
foreign policy is effective in the international level. It is clear that EU’s major foreign policy 
characteristic points out to the promotion of democracy, which is a very important virtue that 
must be introduced to developing nations. In the Tunisian example, EU’s democracy promotion 
and reform campaign did not take root that easily due to political stability in the country, 
especially the changing attitude of the ruling regime prior to the onset of the Arab Spring. The 
EU’s institutions were also divided as to how they would get Tunisia to become involved with 
the programs, often forcing the delays to occur. When Tunisia did agree to increase negotiations, 
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the EU itself did not immediately meet with the Tunisian side before the onset of the 2010 
demonstrations. When the Arab Spring occurred, the EU was unable to bolster the negotiations 
which were yet again halted by the protests to the point that they remained subdued and late with 
their response to the crisis. Considering the example of Tunisia and the nature of EU’s foreign 
policy, it is possible that the EU will show the same type of reaction when it comes to their 
involvement in Egypt when the Arab Spring has occurred in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III: EU-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE ARAB SPRING 
 This chapter expounds on EU’s relationship with Egypt even before the Arab Spring took 
place in 2011. The researcher will be expounding on the several partnership agreements between 
the two countries, from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for Mediterranean. 
Finally, this chapter would also expound on the extent of EU-Egyptian relations prior to the Arab 
Spring, as well as the political conditionality and evaluation of EU-Egyptian relations prior to 
2011.  
 
Before the CFSP 
 Europe has always been considering expanding its presence in the Mediterranean even 
before the 1990s. In the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC) signed several trade 
and cooperation agreements with various countries in the region, including Middle Eastern 
nations. The agreements such as agriculture, industry, infrastructure, energy, education, training 
and scientific cooperation were just some of the few agreements done by the EU with the 
Maghreb countries, Mashreq countries, Israel and Palestine.62 In the case of Egypt, they first 
signed an agreement with the EC in 1977 which established EU-Egyptian relations. The 
cooperation agreement signed by both parties ensured that Egypt would receive assistance when 
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it comes to economic, technical and financial programs to ensure its development, as well as 
commercial cooperation to ensure that Egyptian goods are also delivered in the European 
Market.  
 The Cooperation Agreement also enabled the EC to participate in the development of 
Egypt’s critical infrastructure which would diversify its economic capacity. This partnership 
ensured that Egypt would slowly revolutionize its activities and eventually improved Egyptian 
industrialization and modernization. The Egyptians also flourished in the fields of science, 
technology and environmental protection. Europeans also brought in new income for Egyptians, 
as well as investments to improve the private-public companies in Egypt. Through the EU-
Egyptian protocols and the Cooperation Agreements signed from 1977 to 1995, Egypt received 
the following funds and programs that aided its development: Private Sector Development 
Programme (45 million euros), Support to the Population Programme in Upper Egypt (10 million 
euros), Public Enterprise Reform and Privatization Programme (43 Million) and the Reform of 
the Financial Sector/Central Bank (11.7 million euros).63  
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
The first major development that formally established EU-Mediterranean relations and 
stronger EU-Egypt relations was the Barcelona Conference in 1995. For the beginning of the 
discussions, the EU had begun negotiations with ten Southern and Eastern Mediterranean 
countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Palestinian Authority, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, 
Turkey and Syria. The negotiations included premises on the establishing relations between the 
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two regions. The results of the negotiations were written and adopted the Barcelona Declaration, 
which created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The EMP includes three chapters: 
“Political and Security Chapter”, “Economic and Financial Chapter” and “Social, Cultural, and 
Human Chapter”. The first chapter covers the agreement of both parties when it comes to the 
promotion of peace in the region. The following chapter pertains to the slow, but gradual 
economic integration and finally, the third chapter addresses the enhancement of cultural and 
societal relations.   
To achieve the target set by these chapters, the EMP acted on two levels: bilateral and 
regional. In the bilateral level, the EU and its Mediterranean partners would ensure that EU-
Mediterranean relations are improved and promoted to the people even at an individual level. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements highlights the framework as to how each 
country can achieve relationship promotion and organize action. In a regional level, the EMP 
calls for the establishment of regional dialogue between countries to ensure that they would 
cooperate in improving political, economic and cultural ties between EU countries and 
Mediterranean countries. Further aiding the implementation of the EMP are organizations such 
as the European Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) which serves as a Forum for 
both the European Parliamentary and the Mediterranean partner parliaments for issues regarding 
intercultural dialogue and prepare for the establishment of a European Mediterranean Assembly. 
Other institutions included in the EMP aside from the EMPA also include the Euro-
Mediterranean Summit, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, and the Euro-
Med Committee.64 
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With the application of the EMP, the EU had been in negotiations with Egypt to finalize 
the new version of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement, which has been in development 
throughout 1994. However, the talks were only concluded in June 1999, and the text of the 
agreement was only completed in February 2001 because the support financial objectives under 
the Barcelona Declaration’s Economic and Financial Chapter were not met such as the free trade 
area. The European Parliament approved the entire proposal in November 2001, but it was only 
in 2004 when the Agreement have been placed into action because of the negotiations regarding 
its bilateral provisions.65  As the new Association Agreement was development, the MEDA 
program had been in action to provide bilateral aid to signatories of the EMP. The actions under 
the program aim to fulfill the objectives of the three sectors of the EMP66:  
- Reinforcing political stability and democracy; 
- Creating a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area and the development of economic 
and social cooperation; 
- Taking due account of the human and cultural dimensions.  
The MEDA funds provided to partner countries do not have a fixed percentage allotted to 
each member; however, the amount these partners receive is dependent on their effort and 
progress. The regulation of the MEDA also considers two important details: first, MEDA 
partners do not need to be a country that allows decentralized support to its hierarchy, and it 
requires a high degree of active and equal participation on the site. Second, political 
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conditionality is included in the MEDA funds. Recipients of the MEDA program do not have to 
pay back the funds they receive from the EU. However, the EU does have the power to stop 
MEDA funds if the recipient country has violated the premises of the EMP. A second version of 
the MEDA was later on introduced in 2000 to be implemented until 2006 and had a better 
framework when it came to financial distribution. MEDA II had an overall budget of 5.350 
billion euros from 2000 to 2006, and it was more capable than MEDA I as 90% of the program’s 
funds were used for bilateral affairs and 10% were used for regional activities. The MEDA II 
program was different with MEDA I regarding its priorities because the program will support the 
provisions and programs that will be introduced by the Association Agreement for equal 
economic and social development for both sides.67 
The enactment of the Association Agreement in 2004 worked alongside the MEDA funds 
to ensure continuous political dialogue between the two parties and establish provisions for 
economic development and social improvement. The agreements paved the way for the creation 
of the Association Council and the Association Committee, which ensured the regular 
discussions by both parties are held.68 
European Neighborhood Policy 
 Although the EMP has been successful in bringing together the Mediterranean countries 
and opened negotiations between them and the EU, it was still very limited regarding its capacity 
to reach its targets. Critics emphasized that the problem’s Action Plans be too broad in nature 
concerning their scope, especially with the security provisions of the program. Only the trade 
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policy of the EMP had been met due to the EU’s growing economic interest in the region. The 
adoption of the EuroMed Internal Market Programme in 2002 also ensured the economic policy 
under the EMP flourished. The program pushed for market integration between the EU and 
partner country, especially in specific sectors of the economy. The EMP also received success in 
establishing a partnership for cultural and educational development because both parties believed 
it was a vital component to stop security threats. However, the security chapter of the EMP was 
challenged by several factors, especially after the September 11 attacks. The EU became anxious 
over the possibility of a similar threat happening in Europe, causing the Union to include security 
dialogues in other areas of cooperation such as in social and cultural dialogue. Aside from EU’s 
anxiety over security-related concerns, the hostilities between the Arab partners and Israel also 
affected the EMP’s institutions as representatives from these countries would walk-out from 
plenary meetings and prevent dialogue to flourish between parties.69 Critics also highlighted that 
the EMP failed to achieve its goals due to the “gap between capabilities and expectations.”70 The 
Mediterranean partners argued that the EMP’s policies only serve the European markets more 
than permitting equal benefits between the EU and the partner countries. It is not clear to experts 
if economic cooperation is improved through the EMP because the progress level for the 
improvement of conditions set for the establishment of a free trade zone set to launch in 2010 
remains slow. 71 
The ENP was launched in 2004 as the parties’ attempt to ensure peace and stability in the 
region; while improving programs on economic modernization and human rights protections. 
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Originally, the ENP only comprised the Central and Eastern European countries which were 
trying to recover from their ordeal as former communist states. However, Spain and Italy had 
then suggested that the ENP’s scope included the Southern countries as a means to increase the 
reach of the EU, giving it a more active role in aiding countries settle their issues or concerns. 
The core premises of the ENP was written in the 2004 Strategy Paper, highlighting the regulation 
of cooperation between the southern and eastern countries. This differentiation between the 
Mediterranean and former Soviet countries highlighted that the ENP was a “single, inclusive and 
coherent framework directed to all neighbors.” The Commission recommended in 2006 to 
strengthen the ENP by providing incentives to “privileged partners” from both the southern and 
Mediterranean regions, which included Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Lebanon, 
Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Jordan, Libya, the Palestinian 
Authority and Tunisia. The ENP focused on the gradual opening of the Community’s institutions 
and programs to the ENP; especially on free trade, illegal migration, and counter-terrorism.72 
 For the ENP, security is in its top priorities, and one of this key objectives is to improve 
security at the borders of the EU and promote stability with partner countries. To attain this 
objective, the Union offers partner countries a bargain to gain their cooperation through policies 
and programs that would open the region to these partner countries. The conditions of the 
bargain would vary depending on the relationship and status of the partner country with the EU, 
and the Commitments and Offers are included in the Action Plans highlighting conditionality. 
Partners also greatly benefit from additional market access in exchange for their political and 
economic reform. Trade and free movement of persons were also introduced as incentives to 
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partner countries once they achieve the level close enough for these partner countries to stress 
they are similar to the Union’s stability without being a member.73 
Under the ENP, EU and Egypt had developed EU-Egypt Action Plan, which was adopted 
in March 2007 that strengthened EU and Egypt’s partnership. The Action Plan was considered as 
a means for both nations to pursue active economic integration and further cooperation in 
political, cultural and social level. Similar to the EMP, the ENP also aims to ensure that all areas 
of dialogue between countries can be done to improve Egypt’s economy and society. The ENP 
also tackles principles such as joint ownership, development of national plans and reform 
programs and reciprocal commitments. The EU-Egypt Action Plan was adopted in the EU-Egypt 
Association Council in March 2007 and regularly monitored by several joint bodies to ensure 
that the plan is continuously applied. Observers also see that the EU-Egypt Action Plan 
contained several points reflected in the Barcelona Process and ensured that democracy and 
human rights are sustained while pursuing economic integration. Additional clauses in the 
Action Plan, which call for Egypt to negotiations to speak about provisions on external security 
with the EU. The EU is also ensuring that the Egypt can handle the improvement of energy 
sources and assist in resolving organized crime and other security concerns. Regular Yearly 
Progress Reports are also done under the EU-Egypt Action Plan that would highlight the recent 
improvements did under the system and the challenges to the effectiveness of the EU-Egypt 
Action Plan. It is also considered the major permanent communique between the EU and Egypt.  
However, similar to the EMP, the ENP has several issues that reduce its effectiveness as 
seen in the EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan. On a general extent, the entire ENP Action Plan 
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highlights the general problems in bilateral relations: the problematic authoritarian Egyptian 
state, the necessity of deep involvement in settling the development gap and boosting economic 
cooperation, and tackling concrete problems involving the peaceful EU. On a procedural level, 
the ENP Action Plan confronts the Egyptian government (and other Middle Eastern countries) 
with European governance policies which the Middle East does not regularly apply such as 
permanent monitoring and evaluation of binding agreements public consultation and publication 
of studies or programs, and the inclusion of non-state actors. These governance tools put Middle 
Eastern countries at a disadvantage especially as they are not aware of the extent of these 
European governance policies and how it would clash with the local system. Egypt, for instance, 
adheres to a strict hierarchical system that – in comparison to the European system – the Foreign 
Ministry does not have the same capacity as the European Foreign Ministry that could collect 
information and distribute a more condensed report to other ministries. In Egypt, the Foreign 
Ministry only has a few members who could coordinate with the EU with regards to negotiations 
on handling certain threats and even with these in mind, full application of the ENP is still 
difficult for Egypt due to the lack of competence and differences on which agency to call 
between its ministries on their roles for plan’s enforcement. 74 
Union for the Mediterranean 
With the shortcomings of the EMP and the ENP, considerations were done by the EU to 
ensure that the setbacks seen in both programs would be resolved with another program. The 
newest means to revitalize EU-Mediterranean relations was the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM) which French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed to the European Union to aid the 
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region to tackle security and defense measures better for the Mediterranean. He also proposed 
the creation of the Mediterranean Union that would also cover the resolution of issues relating to 
the environment, energy, and transportation. However, Sarkozy’s proposal had been significant 
because he highlighted the key areas lacking in the previous agreements: open dialogue and a 
more cohesive EU-Mediterranean relation. Reforms on the leadership of the EU-Mediterranean 
Council is also pushed by the Sarkozy's proposal to ensure that meetings can be done equally by 
both parties, and all positions are considered when it comes to decision-making. The new Union 
would also ensure that the Union would be supporting action when it comes to security.75 
Sarkozy’s proposal was immediately reviewed by the Union and slowly tweaked the 
program to include certain policies that would allow the new agreement to work even if the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict. Although there were still ambiguities in certain bits of the proposal, the 
European Council approved the proposal on March 14, 2008, and called the Commission to 
announce the “Barcelona Process: The Union for the Mediterranean.” An official communique is 
released by the communique on May 20, 2008, and introduced the Union’s framework while 
adhering to the Barcelona Process. The first UfM Summit was held on July 13, 2008, and 
highlighted the new structure of the EU-Mediterranean partnership. It also aimed to upgrade the 
relationship between both parties and Mediterranean states now had equal leverage in the Union. 
Although the UfM’s promise was clear in helping equal leverage for both parties, the EU 
remains influential when it comes to the relationship of the UfM and the accession countries. The 
Arab-Israeli Conflict had also stopped the progress of the UfM as Egypt – which holds the co-
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presidency with France – had stopped all UfM activities when Israel attacked Gaza in December 
2008.76  
Political conditionality and evaluation of the EU-Egypt relations before the Arab Spring 
Considering the various programs that were designed to bolster EU-Egypt affairs, there 
were visible lapses that the programs that shook the legitimacy of EU-Egyptian affairs. 
Conditionality pertains to the benefits of partnerships with another state, especially in the 
improvement of democracy in the region. When the enlargement process took place, the EU 
developed its major principles to ensure that countries who wish to become members of the EU 
or partners to the EU are properly screened to determine their current political, economic and 
social structures and address the conditions that may pose problems for their partnership or 
accession to the EU. Upon their release of the EMP in 1995, the EU also added several clauses 
when it comes to adding human rights as a critical component of partnership. Negative measures 
will become active if a partner has violated the premises of the Association Agreements.77 The 
UfM also sets in applying a “multilateral” model that would enhance Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership in a political, economic and civil society level that would enable better negotiations 
with regards to the programs that will be discussed through the UfM such as infrastructure 
development and civil rights protections. Under the UfM, the EU aims to bolster the 
modernization of the Mediterranean in order to emphasize the necessity of stability to develop 
democratic values and societies the EU wishes for the region to achieve. Experts indicated that 
the introduction of the Barcelona Process which instigated the development of the UfM should 
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be used by the EU to introduce projects that would establish the foundations for democracy to 
flourish which is shared by all partners. It is also the aim of the UfM to establish peace and 
stability in the Mediterranean to bolster reform and reduce the impact of any conflicts in the 
region.78  
However, throughout the EMPs applications in the Mediterranean, it was unable to exert 
its power to break off relations even if it was clear there were violations done by the partner 
country.79 In Egypt, for example, the EU Delegation in Cairo stressed that while the authoritarian 
Egyptian government of Hosni Mubarak had claimed they promoted the agreements under the 
EMP, this did not take precedence as the EU discovered that there were still human rights 
violations in Egypt. However, the EU never confronted Mubarak’s regime for these cases and 
just continued their partnership with Egypt. President Mubarak even ratified Law 1533 of 1999 
which restricted freedom of association the country while the discussions for an updated 
Associated Agreement were called. Human rights continued to become severe in Egypt 
throughout the EMP and even through the ENP. Furthermore, it is also clear that the various 
interests of the EU member countries have been hampering the attempts of the EU to impose 
political conditionality in Egypt. When the UfM was enacted, the ongoing issues in the global 
market and the volatile politics of the region failed to solidify changes in Egypt.80 
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Concluding remarks 
It is clear in this chapter that European-Egyptian relation goes back before the EU's 
establishment as the two have been in close negotiations even in the 1970s. The EU – even while 
it was the EEC – provided political, financial, social and cultural assistance to Egypt as a 
signatory to various cooperation agreements meant to bolster EU-Egyptian diplomatic affairs. 
While each agreement – from the EMP to the UfM – had established the standards on how EU-
Egyptian relations can be improved and impose reform in Egypt, it was clear that the EU was not 
strong enough to make sure that Egypt will adhere to each principle underlined in the EMP, 
ENP, and the UfM. The EU does not actively engage Egypt for its violations and let it be for the 
sake of democracy. Considering these points, it is a question if the EU would utilize the same 
behavior when the Arab Spring affects the country.  
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CHAPTER IV: EU-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS IN THE ARAB SPRING 
 This chapter focuses on the European Union’s reactions towards the changing situation in 
Egypt, especially when the Arab Spring has struck the country. The discussions will first begin 
with the reports highlighting instability in Egypt before the uprising and the events which 
occurred throughout the 2011 Revolution. Following this brief discussion is the assessment of 
the EU’s response to the January 2011 uprising and its similarities or differences with EU’s 
actions in the Tunisian uprising. The discussion would then cover the EU’s revised policy in the 
region in light of the Revolution and then highlight how the EU-Egyptian relations shifted with 
the succeeding administrations that took over after Mubarak.     
The Revolution and the EU’s Initial Response 
The instability in the Arab region has already been noted by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) as they indicated in their research that the region possesses 
political, economic and social lapses that could trigger conflict if left unsettled by the Arab 
governments. In the first Arab Human Development Report in 2002 commissioned to indicate 
the challenges for human development in the region, the UNDP stated that: 
“There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions regarding 
participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most 
of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central 
Asia in the late 980s and the early 1990s has barely reached the Arab States. This 
50 
 
freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful 
manifestations of lagging political development.”81 
The data from the 2002 report was supported by the subsequent reports released by the 
UNDP in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2009 and cited similarities in the region’s political systems such 
as the quality of public services, the onset of corruption and grave human rights violations. In 
Egypt, the UNDP indicated that while democracy is practiced through the national elections, 
their leaders often modify mandated term limits to remain in power. The country – like most 
Arab governments – also resort to “legitimacy of blackmail” to gain support from the public and 
the international community against the onset of Islamism. Egypt is also reported for its efforts to 
restrict the formation of political parties to prevent the growth of opposition to the government. 
Under President Hosni Mubarak’s reign, Egypt has also been under a state of emergency that 
ensures the government’s total control over the people. The UNDP also reported in its 2008 
report that Egypt is amongst the seven nations reported by the Arab Organization for Human 
Rights to have grave human rights violations committed by the government as seen in its 
treatment of prisoners in the West Bank and Gaza.82  
However, it was only in the occurrence of the 2010 Tunisian revolt did a revolution occur 
in  Egypt, taking the international community in a state of shock upon its occurrence. The public 
has continuously pressed the Mubarak regime to impose reform and contain the largest religious 
party in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood. The public has also complained against the land 
conversion and privatization of state-owned businesses by the government as these conversions 
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only benefit Mubarak’s cronies.83 With the outbreak of the Tunisian Revolution in 2010, the 
Egyptian civil society groups mobilized through social media and other channels to get support 
from the public and on January 25, 2011, 20,000 participants marched to Cairo and key cities in 
the country to call for Mubarak’s resignation. Mubarak tried to stop the protests by announcing 
on January 29 that he will impose reform in the government. He filled the 30-year vacant Vice 
President slot with the appointment of Omar Suleiman, Egypt’s Director of the General 
Intelligence Directorate to appease the public. 84  However, the public still fought for the 
resignation of Mubarak to trigger reform in the country. Although Mubarak announced on 
February 1 that he will respect the September election results, the public remained in Tahrir 
Square in Cairo to pressure Mubarak’s resignation. When it was clear to Mubarak that he has lost 
control over the public and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which has been 
convened in light of the civil unrest. The 25-member body supported the calls of the public for 
reform in the group’s first declaration on February 10, 2011. On February 11, 2011, Mubarak 
resigned from office.85 
 When the Arab Spring’s first wave had struck in January 2011 in Egypt, the EU had been 
caught off-guard as they did not consider the protests can present such an impact on the region 
and the EU-Mediterranean relations. The Union did not realize the significance of the entire 
crisis, but they realized that they had to keep up with the changing dynamics lest they find 
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themselves unable to keep up with the new changes in the region. 86  There was a lack of 
consensus among the European capitals as to how they would act by the changes in the region. 
Their failure to recognize the importance of the conflict and the continued disagreements 
between member countries disabled the EU from establishing a unified framework that would 
respond to the Arab Spring. Throughout the duration of the Egyptian Uprising of 2011, the EU 
was hesitant in actively stressing their position because their actions would be detrimental to 
their political and strategic interests in the country.87 Critics argued that the EU adopted a “wait 
and see” strategy to determine which protests would usher change. The idle strategy had earned 
the EU criticisms from critics and the Egyptian people who thought the EU would support their 
calls for Mubarak to resign from office.88 However, member countries did make their stance 
known regarding the Egyptian crisis such as Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi 
had praised President Mubarak’s actions on February 4, 2011 and stated: 
“I hope that in Egypt, there can be a transition toward a more democratic system without 
a break from President Mubarak, who in the West, above all in the United States, is 
considered the wisest of men and a precise reference point.”89 
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SCAF Period and EU Action 
 After Mubarak stepped down from office, the SCAF took over the country and assisted in 
the transition process on February 11, 2012.  
SCAF Transition 
The ease on assuming full executive and legislative authority in the country was easy for 
the SCAF due to the popularity it had from the public, dissolving the parliament and suspended 
the 1971 constitution. The SCAF appointed a committee on February 15, 2011 to identify areas 
for reform regarding the constitution and election process for both parliamentary and presidential 
elections. The committee was led by Tareq El-Beshry, a legal expert supporting an Islamist 
ideology, and under his leadership, the results of the study were released on February 26, 
highlighting several amendments to the constitution that would reorganize the election process. 
Some of these amendments included an eligibility criteria and term limits for both the president 
and parliamentary members. The committee also included amendments on the drafting 
procedures for the new constitution involving both houses of Parliament to select 100 members 
to assist with the writing the text of the constitution.90 
The committee’s recommendations were approved through popular referendum on March 
19 and integrated to the SCAF’s March 23 declaration. The amendments were originally 
supported by the public due to the fact they believed these were “amendments”; however, the 
military had used this chance to slip in details from the previous constitution and give power to 
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the current military rule.91 With the enactment of the constitutional declaration on March 23, the 
roadmap for the parliamentary elections would begin in six months. However, observers argued 
that the provision’s applied by the SCAF in light of the March 23 declaration would extend the 
transition and delay the start of elections from late September (the start of filing for candidacy 
for the lower house) to late February 2012 (the last round of voting for the upper house). The 
reason the SCAF applied the provisions is to allegedly provide non-Islamist groups time to 
organize their campaigns.92  The SCAF further stalled the parliamentary elections on November 
28 by stressing some doubts over the original roadmap. In their statements, the SCAF feared the 
potential rise of an Islamist-dominated parliament that would control the drafting of the 
constitution. Although the March 23 declaration extended the transition process, the SCAF 
adhered to Article 60 of the declaration and cited that parliamentary elections were to precede 
writing the constitution and it would be the parliament who would decide the committee that 
would continue the rewriting of the constitution.93 
To prevent the possibility of an Islamist-dominated parliament, the SCAF tried to alter 
the course for the transition through media campaigns such as its declaration on October 20, 
2011. General Mahmoud El-Assar suggested to move the presidential elections on mid-2013 
which is the same time as the deadline for adopting a new constitution. This decision of the 
SCAF to influence the transition process alienated both Islamists and non-Islamists who saw it as 
a ploy to control the public. Insecurity started to spread throughout the country due to the 
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SCAF’s continuous delays on the elections. From September to October 2011, violent protests 
occurred throughout the country in an attempt to oust the military government. However, 
military prosecuted activists and handed them harsh sentences before military tribunals.  
On November 25, protesters went to Tahrir Square to call for a transfer of power from the 
SCAF to a civilian government. Regardless of the protests, the parliamentary elections continued 
on November with the Freedom and justice parity capturing 36% of the vote and 43% of the total 
seats in the lower-house while the Al-Nour took 27% of the vote and 24% of the seats. Smaller 
parties created after the revolution like “The Revolution Continues” only won 3% of the votes 
and 1.4% in the lower-house. The results of the parliamentary elections still retained the tensions 
within Egypt as Non-Islamists argued that the SCAF should transfer its power to the civilians 
prior to the presidential elections. On the anniversary of the January 25 uprising, protests 
centered to the arguments the SCAF should consider on shifting its power to the civilian 
politicians. The Muslim Brotherhood also supported this call for a transfer of power on March 
2012. The continuous arguments regarding the transfer of power persisted throughout the 
presidential campaigns with the parliament denying the candidacy of the several key SCAF 
members and former members of the Mubarak regime. 94 
EU Action Throughout SCAF Period 
Meanwhile, as the SCAF continued to usher transition in Egypt despite the criticisms of 
several parties, the EU’s response on the Arab Spring was formally released on March 8, 2011 
with the joint communique of the High Representative/Vice President Catherine Ashton and the 
Commission proposing for “A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the 
                                                 
94
 International Crisis Group. 6-9.  
56 
 
Southern Mediterranean.” The proposal stressed the need for the EU to support the demand for 
active political participation and protection of equal opportunities for the public. It also proposed 
for the “more for more” principle which would open assistance to recipient countries on the basis 
mutual accountability and adherence to reform.95The communique also indicated that the EU 
intends to revise the ENP to keep up with the changing southern developments because the EU 
was ill-prepared to respond to the crisis in the first two months of 2011 to deliver their Union’s 
full support. To prevent a potential setback to EU action, the new ENP proposed through the 
communique ‘should be a policy of the Union with the Member States aligning their own 
bilateral efforts in support of its overall policy objectives.’96 
 The proposal to revise the provisions of the ENP was seen differently by the EU 
institution leaders such as EU President Herman Van Rompuy, Commission for Enlargement and 
Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and 
HR Ashton. For Van Rompuy, a revision to the ENP is not essential to respond to the Middle 
Eastern crisis but a full enactment of the provisions of the ENP which were not applied in early 
years as these unapplied provisions on security and political change would ensure that 
democracy and restoration of relations is secured between the EU and the Mediterranean.97 In the 
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case of Fule, he supported the use of the old ENP because of the fact it already has a very clear 
framework on how to achieve cooperation, democracy promotion and human rights protection 
which the new Egyptian government may now be able to apply.98 Despite these sentiments from 
van Rompuy and Fule, the ENP was revised under the request of HR Ashton and President 
Barroso to promote a three-fold response that would highlight the ENP’s objectives: emphasizing 
“Deep democracy”, economic development, and renewed connections between people. The New 
ENP would also try to promote “Sustainable stability” in order to ensure that Mediterranean 
countries experiencing transition like Egypt would be supported accordingly.99 
The new approach to the ENP was further elaborated in the May 25, 2011 with the launch 
of a “New Response to the Changing Neighborhood.” The new approach to the ENP highlighted 
two major challenges that it aims to resolve on a short-term and long-term period. The first 
challenge the EU will tackle with the new ENP is the creation on “deep democracy” which 
would boost the improvement of civil society and enable them to take part in the transition 
process. The EU would also push for inclusive and sustainable economic growth and 
development which would influence the stability of democracy in the region. 100 The new ENP – 
as highlighted by the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared prosperity with the Southern 
Mediterranean” in March 2011 – would also reflect the principles which it was based on.  
- Differentiation: Advocates for flexibility for any type of development. This would also 
ensure that the developments and subsequent approaches would take into consideration 
the differences between the eastern and southern halves of the ENP, especially when it 
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comes to full integration and partnership. The implications of this principle would 
indicate that the EU recognizes the fact not all countries would be able to achieve or 
willing to obtain a specific level of integration with the EU and to bolster these countries 
to achieve results, the EU would apply tailor-made strategies that would improve their 
success rate.  
- More-for-more: this principle highlights the clauses on providing incentives to ENP 
partners, especially to ensure that these Mediterranean partners would adhere to the 
premises of the ENP (ex. Support for free and fair elections). This principle also opens 
the ENP partner to better cooperation with other members and achieve higher standards 
for political and social development.  
- Less-for-less: Under this principle, the EU aims to utilize a restrictive set of measures to 
ensure that violators of human rights and democracy would be properly sanctioned and 
ensure that EU funding or assistance would be reduced in lieu of the crime committed. 
This principle would also highlight the EU’s focus on strengthening civil society sectors 
and the reallocation of EU assistance if a recipient country fails to establish better reform 
in their countries.   
- Joined-Up: This principle highlights the importance of regional partnerships and the 
involvement of critical EU institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to ensure assistance. 
Under this principle, the EU would be working closely with other international donors 
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through the Deauville Partnership, which was established as a coordination scheme for 
international financial institutions to reach out to key actors such as the EU.101 
The new version of the ENP also has three major elements considered to ensure stronger 
relations: democratic transformation and institution building, sustainable and inclusive growth 
and economic development, and finally, strong partnership with the people. These three elements 
are elaborated in the “Three Ms” also included in the May 25, 2011 communique that detailed 
the ENP’s new frameworks, stressing that the incentives - money, mobility and markets – would 
ensure cooperation from recipient countries. Collectively, these three factors are expected to 
deliver the resources necessary for sustainable change.102 
Money 
The EU announced on May 2011 that it will provide an additional 1.24 billion euros 
worth of funding for ENP partners on top of the original 5.7 billion euros already allocated for 
the ENP for the 2011-2013 period under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) which handles the ENP’s budget. The EU had also created the Support to Partnership, 
Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) program that would open 350 million euros worth of 
financial assistance from 2011 to 2013 which would support the more-for-more principles of the 
new ENP. The Commission had also opened several programs and investments for small and 
medium enterprises. The Civil Society Facility had also been opened to distribute 22 million 
euros in order to boost the capacity of civil service organizations and their influence in boosting 
democracy promotion and application in their respective countries. The EBRD had also provided 
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funding activities in 2011 in order to support Egyptian efforts to boost their commitments for 
multiparty democracy and market economics. The International Monetary Fund is also working 
alongside the EU to apply the Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) for Egypt amounting to 500 
million euros worth of loans. The MFA was created to complement IMFs financing to long-term 
loans or grants programs and can only be available to countries already assisted by the IMF’s 
programs.103 
Market 
The EU also applied several initiatives to boost the capacity of Mediterranean countries 
to access EU’s internal market and enable investment to flow to these partner countries. One of 
the major initiatives the EU introduced in light of the Arab Spring in Egypt and other Arab 
nations is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). The DCFTAs opens new 
opportunities for partner countries to gain access to the EU’s internal market.104 To establish 
easier adoption of the Free Trade Areas, the Council provided the Commission a mandate to 
initiate negotiations between the EU and Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia to take part in the 
DCFTAs on December 14, 2011. In the statement of EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht, 
he said that: 
“We are offering Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia progressive economic integration 
into the EU single market and want to improve the conditions for market access to the EU 
for these WTO members as they engage in a process of democratic and economic 
                                                 
103
 Behr. 11.  
104
 Ibid.  
61 
 
reform…  Our door is open for other Southern Mediterranean partners once the same 
conditions are met.”105 
 The creation of the DCFTA is also included in the provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements, which include several policies that would ensure trade and investment 
measures that would be applied by the partner country to ensure continuous progress. Regional 
integration is also taken into perspective by the Free Trade Areas, especially for countries who 
have joined the Agadir Agreement in 2001: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan.106 
 Mobility 
 Finally, to ensure that the ENP would boost further integration in the region, the revised 
ENP would include better means to allow Southern Mediterranean partners to move within the 
EU-Mediterranean partnership. The idea of improved mobility has already been introduced to the 
EU and the Mediterranean countries since 2007’s “Communication on circular migration and 
mobility partnership between the European Union and the Third countries.” 107  Mobility 
partnerships were designed to improve migration policies, border security and job opportunities. 
It is said that both parties would benefit the partnership greatly as the EU would be able to 
improve its border security while the partner country would ensure that their citizens can freely 
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travel in these European countries and get assistance in improving their security efforts. In light 
of the Arab Spring in Egypt, the Commission introduced on May 24, 2011 the ‘Dialogue for 
migration, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries.’ The Dialogue will 
begin discussions to ensure that migration, mobility and security would be considered for better 
mobility between the two regions. 108 Aside from the ‘Dialogue for migration, mobility and 
security with the Southern Mediterranean countries’, the EU launched better border management 
systems to ensure that security is airtight for the partner countries and for the EU without risking 
mobility. The EU created the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) to improve the 
EU’s security capacity to deal with border protection. The EUROSUR would also develop a 
“pre-frontier intelligence picture” which would help the EU and their partner countries in the 
Mediterranean to detect threats before they make it to the borders.109 
 Aside from the March 8 and May 25 EU declarations that would revise the EU’s foreign 
policy in the Arab Region and Egypt, a clear statement from the EU regarding the Egyptian 
Revolution was released in December 1, 2011 in the 3130th Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 
the EU Council. Six conclusions were raised by the EU Council regarding Egypt and they are as 
follows: 
- The Council welcomed the peaceful start of the parliamentary elections in Egypt on 
November 28 and praised the high voter turnout to the political transition. The EU hopes 
that the peaceful and transparent process will continue especially on the June 2012 
presidential elections.  
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- The Council also pushed for the swift transition to civilian rule and the SCAF must 
protect the right people and ensure this transition is done as soon as possible. The SCAF 
is also asked to engage with all political and civil society groups in a open dialogue to 
uphold democracy, freedom and human rights.  
- The EU also stressed their concern on the violence occurring in Egypt prior to the 
beginning of the election period. The Council urged restraint for all parties and 
investigations regarding the violence that occurred in the election period.  
- The Council also indicated their concern regarding the dwindling economic situation in 
Egypt and the EU conveyed their support to Egypt for social and economic reform.  
- The EU also iterated their support for a democratic and stable Egypt as a key partner in 
the Mediterranean and Middle East region. 
- And finally, the EU will continue to stand by Egypt for their quest for freedom and 
democratic transition.110 
 In December 18, 2011, HR/VP Ashton also emphasized the EU’s position over the 
Egyptian crisis. She stated that the EU is against the growing violence occurring in the country 
and also stressed that law and order must be protected despite public protests. The statement also 
called for the government and investigate those who have triggered the onset of violence in these 
protests and bring them to justice. Ashton also said that: 
“Egypt is in a middle of a crucial and difficult transformation process. The democratic 
electoral process should continue in a safe and transparent environment.” 111 
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In light of the 2012 Egyptian presidential elections, the EU sent members of the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to oversee the campaigns and 
the election. The EIDHR was established to train local election observers, media, political parties 
and civil society sectors to boost their participation in the election process. Egypt also received 
technical support from the EIDHR for the presidential elections. The EIDHR also assisted 
nonpolitical actors and organizations which are not legally registered to take part in the 
elections.112 However, in the application of the revised ENP, it was difficult for the EU to keep 
up with the expectations of the Egyptian people, especially in the issue of democratization. The 
Egyptian people wanted the EU to contribute not just economic support to the country, but also 
political, technical and legal support to help their ailing institutions. The people wanted a more 
assertive EU, especially in the parliamentary elections and help in the education of election 
officers and observers. The Egyptian people also wanted the EU to expand on its economic 
policies with the Egyptian people, especially now that the Egyptian economy needs assistance in 
recovering from the previous regime.113 The Egyptian people wanted the EU to work actively in 
designing a suitable economic program for the country. The EU is also expected by the Egyptian 
people to take an important role in developing the country’s civil society. While the EU does 
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have active policies for the assistance requested by CSOs and the economy, the Egyptian people 
see that it is not enough in pushing for democracy in the region. Considering all these 
expectations, the Union was unable to keep up with these points and the lack of dialogue also 
prevented progress from taking place between the Union and the SCAF.114 
The first round of the presidential elections took place on May 23-24, 2012 and while the 
names Mohammed Morsi of the Freedom and Justice Party and former Prime Minister Ahmed 
Shafiq were prominent in the polls, the results of the first round reflected that 50% of the voters 
voted for “Revolutionary” candidates whom they believe could represent them in the 
government. However, both Morsi and Shafiq gained more leverage due to the political 
machinery supporting their campaigns. Before the second round of the presidential polls, the 
SCAF continued to pressure political parties in agreeing to a constituent assembly developed by 
the Parliament and agree to the guidelines on the drafting of the constitution. The military 
council spoke with both non-Islamist and Islamist parties regarding the constituent assembly 
despite the case before the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) that would dissolve the 
Parliament and pressure the SCAF to amend the Constitutional Declaration that may limit the 
power of the Presidency. Negotiations; however, failed to reach a definite conclusion as non-
Islamist members from the established constituent assembly accused Islamist members for not 
following the 50% Islamist population on the assembly. Non-Islamists argue that the constituent 
assembly included even moderate Islamist parties and other religious parties gained seats even if 
these seats are reserved for the non-Islamist parties.115 
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On June 14, 2012, the SCC ruled that the Political Exclusion Law passed in May 2012 to 
prevent Mubarak’s former officials from running into office was deemed unconstitutional. The 
SCC also ruled that the electoral law that was used to establish the People’s Assembly was also 
unconstitutional. With this SCC’s decision, the People’s Assembly should be dissolved because 
it was created unconstitutionally. The decision also put into question the military-led transition 
and the results of the election process. The second round of the elections came on June 16-17, 
2012 despite the lack of definite constitution and uncertain government structure with unclear 
responsibilities. Further uncertainty in the Egyptian voting population was also brought by the 
dissolution of the parliament as it signaled further uncertainty over the transition period. The 
SCAF tried to establish further changes by promulgating an addendum to the March 30 
declaration which would make the military an autonomous entity that can legislate, taking over 
the position of the People’s Assembly while a new body is established. The addendum also 
enabled the SCAF to select the 100-member constituent assembly and changed the rules on how 
parties can oppose the draft text of the constitution. Political forces, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, argued against the SCAF addendum, stressing that the military body does not have 
the power to put forward an interim constitution. Despite this unstable political atmosphere, the 
presidential elections continued and on June 24, Farouk Sultan of the Presidential Election 
Commission (PEC) announced that Mohammed Morsi won against Ahmed Shafiq with a vote 
percentage of 51.73%.116 
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Morsi- EU Relations 
 Upon the election of Mohammed Morsi on June 24, 2012, the HR/VP immediately 
expressed her congratulations to the new Egyptian president, stressing that Morsi’s election is a 
“major milestone in Egypt’s democratic transition and an historic moment for the country and 
the region.” It is also the hope of the HR/VP to engage with Morsi’s government whom she 
believes will represent the people and bolster civil participation from all political and social 
groups.117 Morsi’s first few months in office promised changes to the EU as he visited Brussels 
on September 2012 to speak with the EU with regards to further assistance. Morsi’s visit was 
vital for the country and his credentials because EU aid can ensure recovery from a sluggish 
economy. Morsi first spoke with Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, who offered 
macro-financial assistance worth $647 million if Egypt signs an agreement with the IMF. 
However, to sign this IMF agreement, Egypt would have to agree to slash its energy subsidies 
which absorbs a fifth of the country’s spending. The EU is also considering an additional $259 
million budget support for Egypt for an economic recovery plan. These new financial programs 
would come on top the $581 million financial assistance the EU has already allotted to Egypt 
from 2011 to 2013 for the youth sector. In light of the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya in 
Benghazi, Morsi raised a strong position and said. “We [Egypt] are eager to protect visitors, 
tourists, diplomatic missions, public and private properties. We are required by God to respect 
them and to be custodians of those visitors and we know that if one person is killed without 
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justification, it is as if someone has killed all of humanity.”118 He had also met with European 
Council President Herman van Rompuy to reestablish talks regarding EU-Egyptian relations. 119 
 The revised talks between EU and Egypt enabled the establishment of the EU-Egypt Task 
Force in November 2012 under the chairmanship of HR/VP Ashton on November 13-14. 
Throughout the discussions of the Task Force, the EU and its financial institutions (EBRD and 
the EIB) pledged nearly 5 billion euros to provide long-term assistance to Egypt through various 
frameworks. The Commission committed to financial support of over 800 million euros for 
grants and loans. At least 303 million euros would be placed for grants and 450 million would be 
allotted to loans. The EIB would also be opening a lending program of over 1 billion euros per 
year and the EBRD also announced they would be increasing their lending volumes to Egypt by 
up to 1 billion per year.120 
 . In her speech in light of the establishment of the task force, HR Ashton stated: 
“20 months ago, people in Egypt gathered in Tahrir Square to demand political and social 
and economic rights. Since that day, this country has come a long way. But, the people 
continue to drive the demand and it is they that inspire us all to gather here today. The 
holding of democratic presidential elections is a historic landmark for this country. 
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President Morsi has impressed the European Union not just with what he says but his 
commitment.”121 
Although they were supportive over the promise Morsi’s regime would bring to Egypt, 
the EU did not realize that his election was not “democratic” despite the presence of the 
Constituent Assembly and the Parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood had taken over every sector 
of the country and exploited democracy for their own agenda. The Morsi administration also 
established constitutional decrees to retain control over the public. The most notable 
constitutional decree applied by the Morsi administration was the November 22, 2012 decree 
which stressed that: 
1. the public prosecutor would be dismissed, with the President appointing his 
replacement 
2. All trials against government officials from the previous regime, including their 
conspirators, would be reopened while being monitored by an ad hoc prosecutor that has 
additional powers that they can use when intervening in issues brought before them.  
 3. No judicial authority could dissolve the Assembly or the Shura Council 
4. No judicial authority can cancel any policy, declaration, and law applied since June 30, 
2012 and any lawsuit that would be brought forward against these policies will be 
dismissed and voided.  
5. The president could take any measures he sees fit to preserve the legacy of the 
revolution and protect national security.122 
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With the control of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the country and the decrees the 
Morsi administration applied, it was becoming clear that the country remains volatile especially 
when the Islamist-inspired Constitution was finally adopted in the latter half of 2012. 
Considering Morsi’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, they were blamed for the current 
status of the country and the failed political changes they promised in the elections. 
Mismanagement was reported in terms of the country’s budget and political compromises were 
not done by the government to establish political stability. 123 
 
June 30th Revolt and the Transition 
  With the unstable political environment in Morsi’s Egypt, public protests took place in 
many critical parts of the country to call for Morsi’s resignation. The Egyptian Armed Forces 
had imprisoned Morsi and his fellow Muslim Brotherhood members in July 2013. His removal 
had brought concerns to raise back to the EU, especially as they declared their support to 
president Morsi as the first democratically elected leader of Egypt after the Egyptian 
Revolution.124 The EU immediately released a statement following the ousting of Mohammed 
Morsi on July 4, 2013. In the official statement of HR/VP Ashton, she stated that the EU calls for 
swift action in Egypt to stabilize the country. She expressed hope that all sides return to the 
democratic process and hold new presidential and parliamentary elections and the reenactment of 
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the constitution. The EU also condemned the violent clashes that occurred between rival political 
factions after Morsi was removed from office by the army.125 It was difficult for the EU to 
highlight their position regarding the military regime under Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi because it may 
put EU-Egyptian relations in jeopardy. In a declaration made for the EU of HR/VP Ashton, the 
EU declared that:  
“The military must accept and respect the constitutional authority of the civilian power as 
a basic principle of democratic governance. It is of utmost importance that Egypt returns 
rapidly to a legitimate government and democratic structures responding to the 
democratic and socioeconomic aspirations of the Egyptian people… The EU calls for a 
broad-based and substantial dialogue, inclusive of all those political forces committed to 
democratic principles… A successful outcome will depend on the free participation of all 
political actors, including the Freedom and Justice Party, which we encourage to do 
so.”126 
 HR Ashton had also met up with US Secretary of State John Kerry to try organize a 
better solution to the situation in Egypt. Both Ashton and Kerry – in a joint statement – 
highlighted that both the US and the EU ‘support basic democratic principles, not any particular 
personalities or parties.’ HR/VP Ashton also made several high profile meetings in Egypt to 
speak with the new Egyptian officials Al-Sisi regarding the transition process. Several violent 
clashes had occurred throughout August 2013 between the government and the pro-Morsi 
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supporters, which led to several casualties. Ashton called for an urgent Foreign Affairs Minister 
Meeting on August 21, 2013 in light of the developments in Egypt. The results of the meeting 
were declared on September 11, 2013, stressing that the EU had been firm in their efforts to fight 
for democracy and will continue to support the fight of the people to aim for democracy.127 
It was also difficult for the EU to establish negotiations under the current leadership 
because the pro-EU Egyptian key figures have been removed from power after the crackdown of 
the interim government. One of those key figures Mohamed ElBaradei who resigned due to the 
violence triggered by the interim government. He is even charged for his actions because he 
resigned from his post. The Tamarod party used to support the US and the EU efforts in the 
region but they have slowly become nationalist in nature, triggering the calls for the boycott on 
the Israeli peace treaty and the American military aid. The resulting violence triggered by the 
violent manipulations of the current regime forced Europe to stop all arms sales that would 
permit these arms to be used within the country.128 The measure is said to also ensure that small 
arms would no longer be permitted. However, this decision by the EU is not that strong 
considering the current hold of the military in the country. Even if the army would run out of 
bullets and weapons, they can still gain arms through their neighbors and other allies such as 
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, Russia and the United Arab Emirates.129 The EU was also unable to 
reach out to the Muslim Brotherhood even if they were in contact with the group since 2012. It 
became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood was not even aware of the recommendations and 
                                                 
127
 Bremberg. “Making sense of the EU’s response to the Arab Spring.” 22. 
128
 Ibid.  
129
Korteweg  "Europe's struggle for influence.” 
73 
 
criticisms being implied by the EU when its officials visit the country when the negotiations 
during the July 2013..130 
Experts indicated that if the EU asserted a stronger position in Egypt, they could do so by 
suspending aid, withdraw its emissaries, and call on a common demarche on the Egyptian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their actions.131 While the EU can still enforce such actions, it 
was clear that they were unwilling to challenge the current government given the importance of 
the region to EU’s political, economic and social interests. Egypt is an important defense against 
the growing influence of extremism in the region and caused the EU to accept the government. 
The EU and even the US even show signs that they agree with Al-Sisi’s takeover because it 
would mean the Egyptian government would not stray away from the growing violence in the 
Sinai region. Individual member countries have even expressed hope that the Egyptian 
government would have immense power to restore order in the Sinai region. The EU also is now 
fighting against the growing influence of other countries trying to get 132 
 When the Presidential elections was held, the EU was unable to monitor the event after 
their security and safety equipment was stopped from being brought into Cairo. With only 
elections assessment teams in the capital to monitor the Egyptian election, the EU expressed 
concerns that they will not be able to determine the veracity of the results and if the elections are 
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done in consideration with the political issues called by the public. The EU also pushed for the 
election of a pluralist government 133 
 
Al-Sisi’s Egypt – EU relations 
 On June 8, 2014, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi had formally assumed office as the country’s 
seventh president and many were not as surprised with his victory given his popularity with the 
public. In his inauguration speech, Al-Sisi said that Egypt will play an active role in the regional 
and international level as Egypt will recover and become a strong and just state under his rule. 
He also stressed that he hopes Egypt would enter a “full renaissance on both the internal and 
external levels.” Al-Sisi stressed that security and change is a must in Egypt, but he only said 
terrorism once. He also stressed that the new Egypt in his tenure would emphasize in education 
and employment for the people.134 It was also visible in Al-Sisi’s speech that he thanked the Gulf 
nations for their support after the 2013 revolt. The Gulf provided financial assistance to the 2013 
transition government that replaced Morsi in July 2013. Without Gulf assistance, Egypt would 
have been destitute and unable to establish reform under the transition period.135 For the Gulf 
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nations, they praised Al-Sisi and expressed their support in his leadership. King Abdullah of 
Saudi Arabia called for the support of all the friends of Egypt to support Sisi and asked 
Egyptians to fight against the “foreign chaos” occurring in the region for the past three years. 
Aside from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran had also supported Sisi’s election and Iran’s attendance 
in the inauguration ceremony brought the message of a potential Egyptian-Iranian partnership to 
reassure the Gulf.136 
 For the EU, their relationship with Al-Sisi’s Egypt was stable and congratulated him for 
his victory, hoping that the new government would work with the Union in a “constructive 
partnership.”137 Following his elections, Sisi has visited Italy and France in November 2014 to 
re-establish bilateral talks between the two sides. Sisi also visited Cyprus and Spain in April 
2015 to discuss bilateral relations between the EU and Egypt. Aside from these state visits, Al-
Sisi’s Egypt had also made contact with the EU in the Sharm-el-Sheikh economic development 
summit on March 13-15, 2015. The summit, with the title ‘Egypt is the Future’ aims to support 
the development of the Egyptian economy and boost participation from the international partners 
to support Egyptian growth. According to Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb, the summit also aims 
to boost Egypt’s appeal to investors and implement economic and social reforms.138 During the 
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Sharm-el-Sheikh summit, the EU and the Egyptian Government signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) and Joint declarations to support Egyptian development with a grant 
amounting to 130 million euros. The MoU highlights the development of the EU Single Support 
Framework (SSF) for Egypt for 2014-2015 that would indicate the bilateral agreements Egypt 
agreed with the EU for the period. The SSF for 2014-2015 includes the following priority areas: 
Poverty Alleviation and Economic/Social Protection (40%), Governance, Transparency and 
Business Environment (20%) and Quality of life (40%).  
Meanwhile, the Joint Declaration between the Egyptian government and the EU reflects 
the agreement between both parties in 2014 to develop three grant programs that would increase 
EU contribution to 130 million. These grant programs are following: "Access to Education and 
Protection for at Risk Children" programme (30 million euros), "Household Natural Gas 
Connection" (68 million euros) and "Kafr El Sheikh Wastewater Expansion" programme (32 
million euros). 139 The EIB had also signed a loan of 120 million euros for the National Bank of 
Egypt (NBE) to support private sector in Egypt; especially small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). The EIB supported Egypt to improve the Egyptian SMEs to promote productivity and 
competitiveness of the Egyptian economy. The EU had also launched the EU Joint Rural 
Development Programme in the Sharm-el-Sheikh Summit. The program has a budget of 39 
million euros which would be used for the agricultural and rural sectors of Egypt. Rural 
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development under the project would be handled by the Italian Cooperation Office that would 
handle EU grants.140 
However, the EU could not easily influence the development of democracy in the country 
considering the shaky relationship it shares with the Al-Sisi government. Although Al-Sisi had 
made it a point to visit European countries after being voted into office, many EU leaders had 
called against his continuous use of violence to silence opposition leaders and called for the 
transfer of power in the country to civilian leaders and not from the military before they provide 
aid. The EU had even ordered the cancellation of its delegation’s arrival in Egypt to monitor the 
elections in the country and pose an impasse between the two nations. The EU also rejected the 
current human rights status in the country and for Egypt, that is a major blow alongside its 
refusal to watch the parliamentary elections. These two decisions of the EU eventually curtailed 
its influence from affecting the Al-Sisi regime and disabled further talks from flourishing 
between each country. Egypt had prepared several ways for the country to regain EU’s trust in 
the region, but analysts believe that the tactics used by EU regarding the Al-Sisi regime issues 
were a ploy to pressure the country in supporting EU’s interests in the region.141 
Despite the protests and concerns regarding the EU-Al Sisi relations, it has been 
reaffirmed by EU foreign policy Chief Federica Mogherini that Egypt and the EU have very 
stable relations under the Al-Sisi government. In her visit to the recovering country, Mogherini 
had congratulated Egypt on the signs of a potential parliament that would match international 
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democratic standards and boost up Egypt’s capacity to deal with several regional issues. 
Mogherini’s visit was done to enhance discussions between Egypt and the EU and tackled 
critical issues such as the Libyan crisis and the common issues dealt in the country such as illegal 
immigration and terrorism.142 
Democracy Promotion of the EU After the Arab Spring in Egypt 
With the end of the Arab Spring in Egypt, the EU has undergone several negotiations to 
determine how democracy can be reintroduced in Egypt considering its image as a major actor 
on democracy promotion worldwide after the US. In response to the crisis, the EU – through the 
EC and the EEAS launched the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP), 
which aimed to establish a framework that would allow partner countries establish reform to 
accommodate the short-term effects of the Arab Spring to their respective territories. The PfDSP 
identified three major priorities in its framework that would assist in development: 
transformation of democracy and the establishment of associated institutions, the creation of 
people-to-people channels and the promotion of inclusive economic development. Upon its 
application in Egypt, NGOs and CSOs were provided financial reform by the EU to become 
involved with citizens’ development. 143 
The revised ENP also had provisions which highlighted democracy promotion, 
promoting a ‘deep democracy’ framework’ which is deeply embedded in its more-for-more/less-
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for-less principle. The renewed framework of the ENP also indicated that aside from the 
encouragement of the free elections, it also aims to provide assistance to CSOs and NGOs which 
are integral in contributing the achievability of stable transition to democracy by the region.144 
Aside from the ENP and the PfDSP, the EU also introduced the European Endowment for 
Democracy which was also indicated in the revised ENP in 2011. The EED aims to promote 
democracy in countries like Egypt which currently has an unstable relationship with the EU. 
Since it is autonomous from the EU, it can provide funding for partner countries without seeking 
approval from the EU and assist in the establishment of the most effective means in introducing 
democracy and reform. The EED also offers its own range of programs that would aid relevant 
actors identified to be critical actors in democracy promotion. However, it does have limited 
budget of over 14 million euros for the entire region. It is also unclear as to the extent of the 
operations of the EED due to the lack of clear framework and aims of its actions in the region, 
especially in Egypt.145  
Concluding Remarks 
 It is undeniable in this chapter that the Arab Spring’s impact in Egypt is profound, not 
just in the stability of the country but also for the continuous existence of the EU-Egyptian 
relations. Like the rest of the international community, the EU has been taken off-guard by the 
event and disabled immediate action from occurring especially due to the importance of the 
region to the political and economic interests of the EU and its members. However, once it has 
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taken time to understand the crisis, the Union launched several instruments to ensure that 
negotiations for democracy promotion and reestablishment of EU-Egyptian affairs such as in the 
revision of the ENP and the grants provided to the Egyptian government. Despite achieving 
some success in fostering change in Egypt especially with the introduction of democracy 
promotion programs like the EED and the PfDSP, the unstable political environment in Egypt 
disabled the EU’s programs from taking root despite the grants given to the government. The 
following chapter adds additional arguments which supports the argument that the EU is still 
incapable of introducing reform through its foreign policy as discussion would be analyzing the 
impact of the EU member countries and the EU’s institutions in influencing the capacity of EU 
foreign policy.   
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CHAPTER V: THE IMPACTS OF EU’S STRUCTURE AND MEMBER COUNTRIES 
TO ITS FOREIGN POLICY EFFECTIVENESS 
 This chapter focuses on the structure and member countries of the EU aiming to assess 
the ways and the extent to which these two factors influenced the EU foreign policy towards 
Egypt following the Arab Uprising. A critical analysis of the impacts of the individual member 
countries of the EU – specifically the impact of the German, French, Italian and British action - 
on the coherence of EU action is the first topic discussed in this chapter. The discussions would 
include how member countries are influenced with their sentiments on political Islam, the Arab 
Spring and political conditionality. This chapter will also cover an analysis as to how the EU’s 
complex structure and decision-making influenced the EU’s foreign policy initiatives. The 
discussion would also include the limitations that was met by the EU in pushing for its policies 
in Egypt.  
Impacts of the Member Countries on EU’s policy toward Egypt 
 Considering the changing Egyptian political climate, the EU was unable to sustain its 
action’s effectiveness because each member country had different intentions when it came to 
handling relations with Egypt and the ruling regime there and how the EU should act 
accordingly. Currently, the EU has 28 member countries with each member has his separate 
national histories, traditions, constitutions and political systems that make the EU unique in its 
way collectively. Six factors influence the relationship and role of member countries in the EU 
and they are the following: entry date, size, wealth, state structure, economic ideology and 
integration preferences.146 In terms of the entry date, the 28 member countries are divided into 
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five different groups. The first six countries were the founding members of the EU which have 
developed a consensus on European integration as an alternative for the repeated military 
conflicts between European powers. Germany and France had been the key countries that 
developed the idea of European integration. In the 1980s and the 1990s, European integration 
was further deepened with the introduction of aspects such as the European Monetary System 
and the single market. Both nations still remain at the center of the EU. The four remaining 
founding countries – Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands – are frontrunners for 
development and deeper integration. These four countries were also deeply committed to the 
Community method on law-making and push for a stronger Union.147 
However, this stance of the Benelux countries and Italy changed in recent years. For the 
Benelux countries, their cooperation in the EU was lukewarm at best after the introduction of the 
Constitutional Treaty.148 The Constitutional Treaty was developed as a result of the Convention 
on the Future of Europe signed in 2004. The Treaty establishes institutional reform, adoption of a 
charter of fundamental rights and consolidation of existing treaties. The treaty was intentionally 
created to bring the EU closer to the people; however, before the treaty can be applied, there is a 
necessity that all member states ratify the treaty. By 2007, only 18 of the 27 member countries 
had ratified the Treaty but in the case of the Netherlands and France, the Treaty was rejected in 
referenda in 2005. To gain the support of the other countries who has yet to accept the Treaty, 
European leaders agreed to abandon the idea of developing a ‘constitution’ and just amend the 
pre-existing treaties. The 2007 decision also avoided all mention of the constitutional symbols 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This revised treaty is known today as the “Reform Treaty” 
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or the Lisbon Treaty.149 Despite the compromises imposed on the treaty, both Belgium and 
Denmark argued against the text of the Lisbon Treaty especially on the issue of scrutiny rights 
for national parliaments.150 Italy, on the other hand, has alternated between active involvement in 
the EU’s foreign policy and a passive stance in the system. Originally, the country is active in the 
European-institution building but it was not consistent. Italy’s actions in the EU is also 
influenced by the lack of cooperation between Italy’s governing coalitions that prevent collective 
action on the country’s actions in the Union.151 
For the remaining members of the EU who joined after the formative period starting 
1978, they had to agree with the Union’s current laws and obligations (or acquis communautaire) 
and its processes which have been established before the inclusion of this member states. With 
this factor in mind, these member countries cannot make a significant influence on the decision-
making process of the EU’s institutions. In each accession, adjustment makes it difficult for these 
member countries to catch up with each wave of accession. Adjustment is also made difficult by 
the growing policy areas that the Union needs to consider for every expansion. Under the acquis 
communautaire, member countries would have to read over 80,000 pages worth of legislation 
that would continue growing as the expansion continue to grow.152 
                                                 
149
Elizabeth Bomberg, Richard Corbett, and John Peterson. "Introduction." In The European Union: How 
does it work?, by Elizabeth Bomberg, Richard Corbett and John Peterson, 3-22. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012): 9-10.  
150
Laffan, and Stubb. "Member States." 78.  
151
 Ibid 
152
 Ibid.   
84 
 
Regarding size, the influence of each member country is dependent on their classification 
under the Treaty of Nice, and they are divided into four groups: large, medium, small and very 
small member countries. The Treaty reweighed the votes in the Council and the number of 
Commissioners every member state can appoint, preventing the onset of further conflict between 
large and small states regarding the right to vote. The large states – Germany, France, UK, Italy, 
Spain and Poland – possesses a larger voting power but also they have political, economic and 
diplomatic influence in the functions of the EU. Larger states can call upon larger extensive 
administrative or technical resources when it comes to policy-making. Germany is considered 
the most powerful member of the European Union. Medium-sized states follow the broader 
cluster of EU member states and this group comprised the Netherlands, Romania, Belgium, 
Portugal, Hungary, Czech Republic and Greece. Smaller states often have significant influence 
in negotiations because their national interests are often merged easily with the greater purpose. 
Completing the cluster of EU member states are very small member countries which include 
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. However, while size does make some impacts in a state’s 
power in the EU, it has small bearing for national approaches to EU policies involving 
economics, domestic interests, and reform efforts.153 The wealth of each member country is also 
synonymous with their influence in the EU as those with large economies like Germany, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Austria comprise the EU’s 
‘net contributors club’ which allows to control the increases in the EU’s budget and limit costs. 
Poor member countries who are the beneficiaries of the EU’s financial transfers, on the other 
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hand, often argue for larger budget allocation and financial instruments to keep up with their 
fellow member countries.154 
 Regarding state structure, the influence of each member country also varies depending on 
their political structure. The Union currently has three federal states (Germany, Belgium and 
Austria) while the rest of the member countries have either unitary or quasi-unitary governments.  
The unitary states have a central government or the Republic government which tackles major 
issues while regional governments are provided the capacity to act on regional issues. At present, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Hungary, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Sweden are 
the Union’s unitary states. In the case of France, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and the 
UK’s Channel Islands are considered federacies as these countries possess sub-state governments 
that has autonomy in comparison to the other territories or provinces of these countries. Spain, 
Italy and the UK are considered de facto federations or devolved states because these states can 
dissolve the power of autonomous governments and it is the central government dictating 
legislation in the region. State structure influences the EU’s actions establishing its constitutional 
development. Subsidiarity is also an integral element in the influence of state structure as the 
principle states that action should be based on an action of a government that can achieve the 
policy goals without sacrificing citizen interest. Germany is known for being an advocate of the 
subsidiarity principle as the German government won the right in 1992 to send ministers to the 
Council of Ministers when the issue requires their specialties.155 
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 Economic ideology also varies per country and while there are six founding countries in 
the EU, their respective interests brings in different ideologies to the EU. For France and 
Germany, they strive for capitalist policies while Britain supports deregulation and economic 
liberalization based on the Anglo-Saxon paradigm. Finally, integration preferences influence a 
member country’s influence in the EU as considering the majority on who supports a total 
integration of other countries while others fight for a more limited power for new countries. 
Domestic politics often influence how each member country support EU integration and citizens 
of member countries contribute to the member country’s actions in the EU.156 
 Throughout the conflict in Egypt, each member country had influenced EU progress in 
enforcing its policies in the country in several different ways as each member country utilized 
their own agenda when it comes to the stability of Egypt and sustained their respective national 
agenda. When the January Revolt had taken place, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British 
Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy had defined EU action as 
they released a joint statement on January 29 – exactly the time Omar Suleiman was appointed as 
the vice president- without taking into consideration the discussions within the EU regarding its 
official stance regarding the issue.157 According to the joint communique, France, Germany and 
the UK expressed concern regarding the violence occurring in Egypt and called for President 
Mubarak to show the same moderating capacity it has for many years regarding regional 
stability. The three EU countries also called for political, economic and social reforms promised 
by Mubarak and prevent the use of violence against demonstrators. The three states also 
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supported the Egyptian people, citing that the public have legitimate grievances and it is the task 
of President Mubarak to ensure fair and free elections to foster transformation.158 
When the EU was discussing the actions in Egypt on February 4, five member countries 
had circumvented the EU to issue a joint communique that called for an immediate transition in 
Egypt.159 Through the joint communique, France, Britain, Italy, Spain and Germany stressed 
their concerns about the Egyptian situation and condemn the violence occurring in the country. 
The statement iterated the calls for immediate transition to allow Egypt to overcome the 
challenges it is currently facing.160 When the ENP review was called after Mubarak’s removal 
from office, only six member countries – France, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovenia and Malta – 
outlined actions the EU should consider in their relationship with the Mediterranean countries. 
These six countries also called for greater emphasis on the South and recognized the importance 
of differentiating its partners, introducing the “more for more” principle where the EU would 
reward the partner country if they manage to comply with the EU’s request. The six countries 
also suggested that the 2011-2013 financial package meant for Egyptian aid revised in lieu of the 
Egyptian crisis. These member countries also stressed the need for the EU to emphasize on the 
“project” dimensions of the UfM. It was clear this declaration for the UfM’s revival is brought 
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forward by France who wished to get the UfM back on track after several constraints in its 
enforcement.161 
The EU’s stance in the region after Mubarak’s removal had been quite weak especially as 
they took a while before they launched their actions in the region immediately after the Arab 
Spring in Egypt took place. On February 2011, the EU have called for negotiations between 
ministers to decide as to what the Union would do with the assets of Mubarak’s top officials and 
how they can influence developments in the region. Cairo – under the SCAF- had requested the 
EU to freeze the assets of Mubarak’s cronies and his family members. However, the European 
nations were divided over how the action can be done as the UK wished for a total 27 pledge 
from the EU member countries to freeze the assets of the Mubarak cronies while France pointed 
out that the EU must aid in the economic revival efforts for the country first before pushing for 
democracy.162 The decision of the EU to freeze the assets of the Mubarak family and their 
cronies took until March 21st due to the lack of consensus as to what extent should the assets be 
frozen to that the entire EU can contribute to it.163 Under Decision 2011/172/CFSP restrictive 
measures were imposed to key Mubarak officials and related bodies due to proven graft and 
corruption charges. The decision was revised by the Council on November 26, 2012 through 
Decision 2012/723/CFSP which would allow the current government to release certain parts of 
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the frozen funds belonging to corrupt officials and use it for reconstruction and reparations to 
affected citizens where these funds are taken from.164 
Aside from their direct involvement in the actions of the EU, the individual member 
countries also made it difficult for the EU to enact its policies due to the national interests of 
each nation as seen in the actions of four of its major members France, Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. Their respective actions towards the new leaders of Egypt clashed consistently 
with the image the EU tried to convey throughout the period and the lack of respect to the EU 
had also instigated difficulties in terms of moderating the position of the EU in Egypt, especially 
on introducing democracy and reform.  
France 
When it comes to the foreign policy of France, the country does not support political 
conditionality unlike its fellow European countries. Since the 1992 Franco-African Summit, 
France has been keen on pursuing security first for its international initiatives, followed by 
development and democratization. French Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Daums 
indicated that economic reform must be first because it would provide the foundations for 
democratization. In 2006, the country introduced the “Governance Strategy for French 
Development Assistance” which highlighted that a “turnkey” human rights and democratic 
model would be null and void if it disrupts the capacity of the society to decide for themselves. 
With this remark, the French government stated that cooperation “should not be measured so 
much by its ability to lay down universal standards manipulated in the abstract through 
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conditionality as it should be assessed by its ability to provide each partner with specific 
experiences and expertise to enable them to develop their own policies.” France had reaffirmed 
their position on conditionality’s ineffectiveness in 2007 as they indicated that recipient countries 
of French Aid only needed to have a strong and sustainable macroeconomic program, a growth 
and poverty reduction program matching the MDG standards and a good public financial 
management system. In 2011, the government yet again reiterated its move away from 
conditionality with the “Development Cooperation: A French Vision”. This long-term strategy 
highlights that the country will now move “from a development assistance policy which implies 
an asymmetrical donor-beneficiary relationship over to a policy of cooperation with developing 
countries.” The government would also support the development of good governance, but the 
country will not interfere with how the recipient country would be developing their protocols. 165 
Similar to the rest of the Western European nations, France also has a significant number 
of Muslim communities in its midst. However, many French citizens were scared of the growing 
Muslim visibility in the 1980s. Since France had always adhered to secularism, French animosity 
towards Muslims have always been strong and indicated the growing misunderstanding between 
both groups. In recent years, the political position of France towards Islam has been growing 
away from hostility because of the peaceful prayer session in the mosques throughout the 
country and the misconceptions regarding home-grown Muslim extremism have been declining. 
The government had opened several key institutions that would provide Muslims representation 
in the country and protect the country from the growth of radical Islam. In recent years, the 
Islamic movements in France had been divided to different schools of Islam and the universalist 
schools formed by young Muslims. However, as the movements of these two groups of Islamist 
                                                 
165
 De Felice. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality” 32-34.  
91 
 
movements in the country, the French government is now trying means in ensuring that French 
Muslims could easily integrate to the country while still retaining their values and still stick to 
the modernity that France upholds in their country.166 
 France’s stance on political conditionality and political Islam can be seen roughly in its 
response to the Arab Spring while maintaining its support to EU action. President Sarkozy 
imposed an image that it is France that has the capacity to lead the EU leadership when it comes 
to the onset of the Arab Spring in comparison to its European counterparts, pushing for a more 
aggressive and active EU to respond to these threats. However, France failed to realize the 
capacity of the protests to predetermine the status quo in the entire Mediterranean which disabled 
their targets to be reached in the region. Despite this failure to the French approach to the Arab 
Spring, France had taken different strategies per country to responding the impacts of the Arab 
Spring in these countries as France takes into consideration their relationship with the country. In 
Tunisia, for example, France had backed ousted President Ben Ali. On the other hand; the 
country had taken a slightly discreet distance when the demonstrations in Algeria and Morocco 
began and supported the respective governments for its efforts to sustain democracy. There was 
also inconsistency in the prospect of human rights protections as seen in Bahrain because when 
the regime had used violence to repel the opposition, France had suspended their exports and 
indicated they would continue trade if the country respects human rights.  
 In a European level, the French government had continued to support EU action for 
democracy and reform, but it did act unilaterally to push for the application of their initiatives to 
aid recovery efforts. In Tunisia, for example, when the European Commission opened 258 
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million euros to support the country, France had added 2 months later that they will contribute 1 
billion euros for both Egypt and Tunisia, emphasizing that they believe in economic recovery as 
a means to then restore democracy with it. The unilateral moves done by France under Sarkozy 
also reflected how the country blends with EU multilateralism, especially when it came to the 
issue of immigration. France has been very opposed to hosting a huge number of Muslim 
communities in its midst due to the traditional stigmas brought by Islamism in the country in 
previous years. Critics did point out that Sarkozy’s unilateralism had only disabled an effective 
EU action in the Mediterranean and their continuous movement only showed that it is not one 
with the southern territories and violated EU norms.167 
 With the election of President Francois Hollande, he revised the French approach for the 
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in October 2012. France would still be supporting financial aid 
in the region to improve infrastructure in the Maghreb region. Hollande also highlighted the 
improvement of the UfM and boost it with the ENP, incorporating the UfM as one of the 
program’s implementation agencies. Hollande also opened the “5+5 Dialog” which would 
compensate for the failure of the UfM so EU and MENA countries could reach out better. France 
had also supported economic and logistical growth for Algeria, which is a critical ally to the 
country in the Middle East. France and Algeria had signed several financial agreements to boost 
economic and financial cooperation between France and Algeria. 168 
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 When it came to the issue of Egyptian Uprising, the French had shown two opposing 
sides as they were previous allies with the ousted President Hosni Mubarak. In a statement after 
the protests, President Nicolas Sarkozy admitted that he underestimated the significance of these 
protests and highlighted the necessity to revising EU policies in the region. He also admitted that 
the country had only understood the gravity of the situation in Egypt and in the rest of the region 
when Mubarak had been forced out of their position in the UfM. They were also unable to 
establish strong solidarity in the demonstrations because of their previous engagements with the 
ousted president. 169  When it became clear that Egypt’s Mubarak will indeed fall, France’s 
political Islam stance immediately caused them to challenge EU integration towards these 
nations alongside Italy. In a joint statement, both Sarkozy and Italy Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi demanded that the EU launches deportation pacts and return escapees back to their 
home countries. Both countries called for reform, especially for border-free regimes they wish to 
push with the Euro-Mediterranean partners.170 Under Hollande’s leadership, France maintained 
in better ties with Egypt as they have recently signed an economic deal with the country 
amounting to $6 billion in military hardware. Egypt has recently requested France to shut down 
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Muslim Brotherhood’s satellite channel El-Sharq because it is affecting Egypt’s efforts in 
restoring democracy in the country.171 
Germany 
 Germany’s foreign policy also supports political conditionality, especially when it comes 
to their aid efforts. Germany became one of the earliest key donors in Western Europe after the 
Second World War. Originally, the country’s political conditionality effort involved the 
combination of diplomatic relations and foreign aid, while also pushing for the non-recognition 
of the German Democratic Republic. However, this attempt was not successful considering the 
fact the GDR was recognized by the United Nations. In their next attempt in the 1980s, 
development aid provided by the Federal Republic of Germany entailed the adherence of 
recipient countries to human rights and democracy protection. The federal government expressed 
that the country will fight for the establishment of democratic structures because this will 
improve the protections that would be able to be given to the oppressed population. Two years 
later in 1984, the Bundestag had yet again readopted this goal in their newest protocols and 
highlighted that recipient countries must reach a higher level in the protection of civil and 
political rights. Further political reforms to Germany’s aid programs in 1989 and the 1990s to 
ensure that development programs would be better for the betterment of cooperation between 
parties. The country had introduced a five criteria system for Germany’s development efforts and 
they are the following: 
 1. Respect for human rights and liberties 
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 2. Active civil society participation in political reform and activities 
 3. Respect to the rule of law 
 4. Application of market-friendly approaches for economic development 
 5. Active commitment of the recipient country to development.172 
 Similar to France, Germany also has a growing distrust with regards to the Muslim 
population in the country, especially with the growing Islamisation in some of its Muslim 
groups. In an assessment done by Gatestone Institute, a majority of the German Muslim 
population believed in the strict adherence of its people to the Sharia law before taking into 
consideration the constitutions of their host countries. Although Germany has enacted policies 
that would protect the Muslim population in the country, several groups and critics indicated that 
these agreements with the German government do not bolster discussions that would improve 
Muslim integration in the country. It only fosters the development of a parallel Muslim society 
that separate these Muslims from the rest of the German people. Due to the growing crackdown 
in France, Germany has expressed concern over the possibility that the violence in the country 
may grow especially with the German Islamists already in the country. Germany is trying to 
crack down German Islamists in the country which is calling for violence towards the German 
people. Several Islamist groups have already been banned in the country in light of the growing 
Islamic propaganda transmitted in Dusseldorf, Gladbeck, Solingen and Frankfurt. The German 
people, in light of the numerous arrests and propaganda growing in the country, all expressed 
that they consider Islam as a threat to their security even if the government firmly claims that 
these people are welcome in Germany. Currently, continuous debates and arguments regarding 
Islamism continue to divide the country and its Muslim population due to the incapacity of the 
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German government to reach a compromise with the Muslim groups, especially in the 
application of certain aspects of the Sharia law to German policies.173 
 Germany is undeniably one of the EU’s most powerful countries and its influence in the 
EU’s policy in the Arab Spring. Germany always saw the region as a region of limited strategic 
importance except for countries like Israel and Iran. It was content in allowing other nations to 
take part in the affairs of the region while establishing partnership with the country silently. If 
they had to intervene, Germany would only do it to stop French influence in growing in the 
region. With the establishment of the European Neighborhood Policy and its application in the 
region, Germany wished to establish reform in the UfM in order to reach out to influential parties 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood and establish continuous business partnerships in the region. 
However, when the Tunisian regime of Ben Ali had slowly fallen apart, it was clear to Germany 
that EU policy will no longer work in the region and called for reform, as well as criticized 
southern EU nations for not taking action in the region. While most of its actions and decisions 
tend to clash with the French government, it was clear that Germany was now looking at the 
region in a new light and reassess their regional position in the Middle Eastern issue now that its 
national interests are now at risks from the unstable conflict.174 
 In the case of Egypt, the German government has signed the “Berlin Declaration” with 
Egypt and several other agreements with the country on August 12, 2011. Under the agreement 
of Egypt and Germany, Germany would support the calls for bilateral cooperation and enable 
Egypt to pay off its 240-million-euro debt for the ODA within the span of four years which 
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Egypt will reciprocate with the introduction of reform, especially in democracy. It also opens 
channels for discussions between the two nations to discuss critical issues affecting the region 
and the globe. Egypt greatly benefitted with their partnership with Germany as the funds 
provided by Germany to boost its civil society sector. Germany was also very open for active 
engagement by introducing new foreign aid commitments in exchange for better development 
cooperation and engagement by the recipient countries.175 
 When Al-Sisi was voted into office, German Chancellor Angela Merkel refused to meet 
with Al-Sisi because she wanted to see Al-Sisi’s initiative to start the parliamentary elections 
before meeting with the new president. Al-Sisi had postponed the elections and it was clear 
Merkel did not stick with her foreign policy initiative as Al-Sisi arrived in Berlin on June 3, 
2015. Experts indicated that this visit had several national interests taken into consideration as it 
would boost business initiatives of German companies in Egypt. German companies would see 
Al-Sisi’s visit as a go signal for starting investments in the country. Merkel had also stressed 
through her spokesman Stephen Seibert that she will meet the Egyptian president because “Egypt 
is an immensely important player in the Arab World” and would contribute greatly to the peace 
and stability of the region.176 In their joint press conference, Merkel had expressed that they will 
aid Egypt in economic development and aid the country in its fight against extremism. Merkel 
had also stressed in her statement that: “Egypt is one of the central countries in a region marked 
by unrest and instability” and helping the country’s business sector would reduce instability 
                                                 
175
Behr. Germany and the Arab Spring. 3. 
176
Judy Dempsey. "Germany Welcomes Egypt's Sisi." Carnegie Europe: Strategic Europe. June 1, 2015. 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=60260 (accessed November 11, 2015). 
98 
 
greatly. Merkel did criticize the Al-Sisi regime in his visit in terms of its human rights policies, 
especially on the issue of the death penalty.177 
Italy 
 Like other European countries, Italy has a significant number of Muslim population in the 
country reaching up to 1 million Muslims. Most of of these Muslim population come from 
Albania, Morocco, Tunisia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan and Bangladesh. With the 9/11 attacks 
and the 2005 terrorist attacks in London, Italy has enacted the law “Package Pisanu” which 
would empower the government to provide “urgent measures against international terrorism” in 
2005. The package consists of 19 articles involving security, anti-terrorism and immigration 
policies; highlighting the suitable response of the country towards security threats.178 Using the 
Package Pisanu law, the Italian police managed to investigate several imams in 2007 after tips of 
these imams teaching Islamic extremism. The most notable example of the 2007 probes was the 
case of Mohamed Kohaila who had been reported to commit anti-Western behavior and violence 
after official investigations. In 2008, Italy’s “best known anti-terrorism magistrate” Stefano 
Dambruoso stated that Islamic extremism has already spread in Italy prior to the 9/11 attacks.179 
 When the Arab spring occurred in 2010, Italy had expressed concerns regarding the 
regime stability of the South rather than the promotion of civil rights and equality especially in 
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Algeria and Libya. The Italian government expressed concerns of the potential impacts of the 
political liberalization that would be produced once terrorism and immigration enter Italy from 
partner countries. In response to the changing situation in the Arab region, Italy concentrated on 
“immigration” coming from southern Mediterranean regions. Italy opened humanitarian permits 
to incoming migrants in order to enter the country freely. The country also took part in a joint 
proposal with France to revise the Schengen system to monitor free movement of people within 
the region. When the Arab Spring occurred in Egypt, the Italy had declared a state of emergency 
to ensure full monitoring of the migrant flows from the region.180 
 After the removal of Mubarak, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi invited SCAF chief 
Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi to Rome on June 2 to take part in the celebrations 
for Italy’s establishment as a republic. The visit would also rekindle negotiations between Cairo 
and Rome regarding trade partnerships and more Italian investments in Egypt.181 Under the 
Morsi regime, Italy agreed to invest 800 million euros in Egypt when the Egyptian president 
visited Rome on September 2012. Morsi met with President Giorgio Napolitano and both leaders 
declared that they will work in partnership to boost bilateral relations and economic cooperation 
between the two countries. Prior to Morsi’s visit, Egypt signed an agreement with Italy in May 
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2012 for the debt swap worth $100 million for Italian investments.182When El-Sisi assumed 
office in 2014, he flew to Italy to meet with both the Italian Prime Minister and President to 
discuss military coordination to combat Islamist militias in Libya and the improvement of Egypt-
Italian economic ties. With regards to his meeting with Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Sisi is 
expected to broach the topic on investments and poverty reduction programs.183 
United Kingdom 
The British government has often endorsed the adherence of the country to political 
conditionality to its foreign aid programs since the end of the Cold War. In order to make sure 
that political conditionality is applied in its foreign policy, the Labor government in 1997 had 
established the Department of International Development or the DfID) which would request 
recipient governments of British aid to “pursue policies which promote responsive and 
accountable government, recognizing that governments have obligations to all their people [and] 
promote the enjoyment of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights”. In 2005, the 
DfID had worked alongside the British Treasury and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) in indicating the country’s aid commitments and revised them to match the current 
situation in the international community. Under the document “Partnership for poverty reduction: 
rethinking conditionality”, the new aid commitment of the UK will have three objectives: 
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1. Reduction of poverty and the fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals 
2. Respecting human rights and international laws 
3. Empowering financial management and accountability of recipient countries.  
If recipient countries would fail to achieve these objectives despite British aid, the 
country has the power to rescind aid especially if evidences of the recipient country’s violations 
are forwarded to the British government. This conditionality policy has continuously been seen 
in various aid programs of the country around the country and in 2011, the DfID further boosted 
this policy under the “Technical Note on Implementing DfID’s strengthened approach to budget 
support.” The UK also expressed that they will be reviewing governments applying for British 
aid and push for domestic accountability before their aid would be given. Aside from political 
conditionality towards economic aid, the British government also applied shared commitments 
for human rights in developing countries.184 
When it comes to political Islam or Islamism, Britain currently has a sizable Muslim 
population which mostly are immigrants that entered the country since the 1950s either as 
refugees, immigrants or asylum-seekers. With the onset of the 9/11 attacks, Britain had been on 
alert for the possibility that these Muslims may conduct attacks on terrorism in the country. In 
2003 and 2004, the British fears were justified when discoveries of weapons that can be used for 
attacks throughout London. In 2004, authorities arrested Muslim cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri for 
encouraging murder on Jews and non-Muslims to impose the sharia law. The 2005 London 
transportation bombings also caused the British government to reassess their position on 
Islamism in the country. The British government condemned extremists currently causing 
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terrorism to flourish in the country and even British Muslims expressed opposition towards 
political Islam. In order to counter Islamism’s growth, the British government – like other 
Western European countries – applied a three-pronged approach:  
1. Application of general counterterrorism policies that do not pertain to a 
specific sect of Islam 
2. Use policies that would repress Islamism 
3. Use of policies that would ensure that Muslims can integrate to their 
respective countries.  
Britain had also reformed its anti-terrorism strategies to match the international standards 
against Muslim extremism. The country introduced the CONTEST counterterrorism strategy that 
sustains the following strands: 
1. PREVENT – integrate Muslims to the British society and challenge extremist 
tendencies of these Muslims.  
2. PURSUE – repress violence by monitoring Muslim terrorist movements through 
intelligence gathering and law enforcement operations.  
3. PROTECT and PREPARE – reduce vulnerability of potential targets and ensure 
effective response towards any attacks.185 
When the Arab Spring had occurred in the Middle East in 2010, Britain’s response had 
been supportive to the EU effort as the Arab Spring would now usher a more active democratic 
growth in the region. According to UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, Britain’s actions 
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regarding the onset of the Arab Spring comprises three principles.186 The first major principle is 
the fact Britain would not dictate the change outside the country and they would not get involved 
in the issue directly. The British government recognizes that the conflict in the region is not 
Britain’s revolutions and the country cannot decide as to what future these Arab countries should 
have. However, Britain would help in ensuring diplomatic pressures would be applied in 
transition governments to support change. The second principle entails the importance of human 
rights and freedoms and the British government believes these rights would be followed 
accordingly by transition governments. It is the belief of the British government that these 
transition countries would begin the process on democracy because it is expected of them by the 
international community. Finally, the British government’s actions regarding the Arab Spring is 
also quite passive to the point that they would only become involved with funding and necessary 
international pressures that would assist in the development efforts. The British government had 
also expressed that the country would be working alongside other organizations such as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, the Arab League and the EU in pushing for political transition and 
economic recovery for the Middle East, especially the Middle East peace process.187 
Taking into consideration the position of the British government regarding Islamism, 
political conditionality and the Arab Spring, its actions in the Egyptian Uprising had indicated 
their national interests in securing the country as a political ally while expressing their support to 
the EU in some of its policies.  The country sees Egypt as a key partner for the success of the 
Middle East Peace Process alongside Sudan and Iran. Egypt is also seen as a buffer against 
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extremist in the region and a key commercial partner of Britain. With the onset of the Arab 
Spring, Britain had immediately increased dialogue between key Egyptians leaders and 
protesters, calling for democratic elections.188 Prime Minister Cameron himself had flown to 
Egypt immediately after Mubarak was removed from office and portrayed the country as a 
“candid friend” of the Egyptian government. He called for the Egyptian interim government to 
adhere to the existing commitments of the country with the international community and begin 
free and fair elections. Cameron also indicated that the British government would not just focus 
on economic trade, but also to push for political reforms, security improvements and improved 
commercial channels for British businesses.189 By the time Morsi stepped into office, the British 
government sent their invitation to have the Egyptian leader visit the country so they can discuss 
effective partnership and democracy promotion in the new regime. The British government also 
promised that Egyptians hoping to escape would be returned to Egypt, including the members of 
Mubarak’s regime as a condition to get Morsi to acquiesce to British requests.190 
With the recent election of President Al-Sisi to the Egyptian government, it was clear to 
critics that Britain’s national interests would be affected especially in terms of Britain’s 
adherence to the promotion of human rights if they reach out to the Al-Sisi regime. With the EU 
still in somehow shaky terms in the region and human rights still a critical concern in improving 
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democracy in the region, the British government had accepted the Egyptian president’s visit to 
London despite the criticisms of such action. Cameron had invited Al-Sisi in order to discuss 
with him the review regarding the Muslim Brotherhood which would coincide with the country’s 
aims to improve their action against extremism. Al-Sisi’s visit was a way for him to express that 
Britain is ready for any form of attacks from extremist factions in the country. Britain’s 
continuous relationship with Egypt through Al-Sisi’s visit further boosts the country’s 
cooperation with Egypt and ensure that they can protect each other from any threat and ensure 
that their national interests are still protected. 191 
 
Impacts of the EU’s Structure and Decision-Making System to EU’s Policies 
 Finally, EU action could not really work in the Egyptian Uprising because of EU’s 
complex structure and decision-making system which disabled the country to establish better 
coordination with its member countries and handle the changing political environment of Egypt. 
Aside from the composition of its member countries, the EU is made unique because of the 
institutions that influence its decision-making capacity and influence in the region. The most 
powerful institution in the EU is the European Commission, which represents the the EU in the 
international community and also ensures that each member country adheres to EU treaties and 
legislation. The Commission also has the power to propose policy, lead in trade talks, establish 
competition policy and ensure member country compliance. Most of the powers of the 
Commission come from the Treaties that support the EU’s structure and standards.  
                                                 
191
Umberto Bacchi. "Sisi UK visit: 'Muslim Brotherhood review ready' David Cameron tells Egyptian 
president." International Business Times. November 5, 2015. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sisi-uk-visit-muslim-
brotherhood-review-ready-david-cameron-tells-egyptian-president-1527423 (accessed November 10, 2015). 
106 
 
The Council of Ministers follows the Commission in terms of its influence in the EU’s 
structure and it is considered the primary decision-making body of the Union alongside the 
European Parliament. The Council has a very complex system as to how it acts as a legislative 
body. Meetings done by Council members often entail different configurations depending on the 
issue in question. If the Council will be meeting for environmental protection, the ministers that 
should meet in the council are the environmental ministers. Ten additional Councils are also 
within the Council to ensure all critical subjects that the EU needs to take into consideration such 
as foreign policy, general affairs and budgets are taken into consideration by a specific sector. 
When it comes to voting, the Council of Ministers used to follow a majority voting system to 
decide on legislation. However, this had to change after the 2004-2007 enlargements since new 
governments had to be added with the system. The Council also follows a “Community method” 
to decide on sensitive issues such as foreign policy. Currently, the rules of voting require a triple 
majority before legislation can be brought into discussion from the Council of Ministers.192  
Working groups are often established by the Council to scrutinize texts and proposals and then 
they determine if the proposal holds merits for the EU in general. Once a consensus is met, it is 
forwarded to the Coreper, which would then tackle the proposals and decisions before they are 
passed to the European Council. If the proposal is politically-sensitive, member countries are 
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provided the chance to establish negotiations with other parties to reach a compromise to settle 
the legislation for the European Council.193 
The next agency within the EU that sustains its power is the European Council, which 
comprises the members of the Heads of Government and highlight negotiations between each 
member to discuss critical policies and issues. Members meet four times per year to discuss 
issues like enlargement, climate change and treaty reforms which had been brought forward in 
each meeting. The Council also tackles issues that cannot be resolved within the Council of 
Ministers. The Lisbon Treaty further boosts the role of the European Council to nominate the 
President of the European Council, which would be the counterpart of the President of the 
European Commission. The President of the European Council tends to serve as the mediator 
and facilitator of European Council Meetings and assist in the enlargement efforts of accession 
countries to the EU. 194 
Similar to the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament also takes into consideration 
the legislative functions of the EU. Many consider the Parliament as the voice of decision-
making in the EU. Unlike other Parliaments in a national level, the European Parliament cannot 
initiate legislator and it can only discuss aspects like spending when it comes to the budget of the 
EU. However, it does forcefully exercise its legislative powers and decides on all EU legislation 
before it can be passed to law. The Parliament also determines if the EU would accept a 
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particular policy and agreement. 195  Specialized parliamentary committees are established to 
ensure that legislation is properly analyzed and trigger political negotiations between member 
countries to establish compromises. Ministers are given the time to propose amendments to the 
proposals directed in the parliament before the legislation is sent to the full Parliament for review 
and voting. Political parties often get involved with the negotiation process and as a result, the 
Parliament tend to create a composite amendment to ensure that each party will support the 
legislation. Once it is approved by all parties, policies can be put into force after a year.196 
Finally, the EU also has its very own Court of Justice and unlike its other fellow EU 
institutions, it does not have a very strong power in the EU. The ECJ ensures that the Treaties of 
the EU are properly interpreted and applied. It is also the final arbiter should there be legal 
disputes between institutions or member countries. The Court also monitors the adherence of the 
EU member countries and institutions to their responsibilities. The ECJ can also fine member 
countries should they violate EU law at anyway. The ECJ also helps member countries to 
determine how EU law can be applied in the rulings of national laws, especially if it has 
European leanings. If the Court has a pro-integration agenda, it boosts the capacity of national 
courts to be included in the EU’s legal system and assist in the resolution of conflicts. 
Oftentimes, critics of the ECJ state that it is a policy-making body rather than a judiciary body 
considering the influence they play to the interpretation of law for the national level. 197 
 With the various functions and systems within the EU, it was difficult for the EU to 
establish a strong response to the Egyptian Uprising. It was not clear for members of the EU as 
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to how they can utilize the Union’s influence in the Egyptian region given the different positions 
of EU institutions on how EU action should be established. Since the EU could not coordinate its 
member countries, it took them a while before they can make a clear action in the Egyptian crisis 
as seen in the freezing of assets of Mubarak’s people. The heads of critical EU agencies such as 
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy also had been assertive when it comes to 
stressing that Mubarak must show his sincerity while High Representative Catherine Ashton had 
expressed a simple statement that the government recognizes the human rights of protesters. The 
Council, Commission and the Parliament were also divided over the stance the EU must take. 
The Parliament wanted an assertive EU to take action in the Egyptian Uprising, releasing a 
resolution on February 17 stating that it will concentrate on Egypt’s democratic transition and 
then review the ENP. The Council took almost a month before the assets of Mubarak’s people 
were frozen in Europe on March. The High Commissioner was also unable to boost EU action 
without the support of the members of the Council and approval of the Parliament and 
Commission. 198 
 The Parliament continued to press on other EU institutions to resolve the succeeding 
conflicts in Egypt. When President Morsi gave himself expanded constitutional powers through 
several constitutional decrees, the head of the European Parliament Martin Schulz stated that the 
EU should put economic pressure on Egypt to stop the Morsi regime. In his statement, Schultz 
stated that “The European Union must make it clear that there can no political nor economic 
cooperation without pluralist democracy in Egypt.” He stressed that only economic pressure can 
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influence Morsi to stop his continuous rise to power.199 In September 2013, the Parliament also 
released its resolution on the July 2013 coup. In their resolution, the Parliament stated that it is 
one with the Egyptian people in calling for justice for those who have been killed in the violent 
clashes throughout the country. The Parliament criticized the Muslim Brotherhood for failing to 
stop their supporters when it comes to their response to the protesters and condemned all forms 
of violence and terrorism spreading in the country. The Parliament also calls for a immediate 
political transition to ensure the transfer of power from the military to civilian authorities and 
call the active participation of the people. The Parliament had also urged the Union to consider 
the principles of conditionality and the economic challenges that may prevent Egypt from 
achieving the standards set by both parties in terms of its aid program. The resolution also 
reiterated the establishment of an EU mechanism that would provide legal and technical 
assistance to all Arab Spring countries under its May 23, 2013 declaration which had been 
postponed due to the Egyptian coup.200 
 The EEAS was also ineffective in pushing for immediate action and implementation of 
European foreign policy in the region. Upon its establishment, the EEAS was considered to be an 
autonomous from the Commission’s control. It was also meant to be the first response team of 
the EU in times of crisis such as the Arab Spring in Egypt and serve as emissaries for the EU. 
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However, since the EEAS did not have a clear political vision or initiative in applying the EU’s 
foreign policy goals overseas, the EEAS was unable to achieve its doctrine and caused problems 
for the EU by the time the Arab Spring had occurred. Further adding to the problem of the EEAS 
is the conflicts within the EU agencies with regards to the benefits to the EU’s foreign policy. 
Some EU agencies argued that the EEAS should be disbanded as its tasks is similar to another 
DG’s functions, while others argue that the EEAS does not have the mechanisms and policies 
needed that would legitimize its benefits as an agency for the enforcement of the EU’s foreign 
policy. 201 
Concluding Remarks 
It is clear that the EU’s action in the Egyptian crisis has been heavily curtailed by three 
factors which stopped any of its policies from taking into fruition since 2011 to the present time. 
Aside from the changing political environment in Egypt, muddling the EU’s actions in the region 
is the different national interests of each one of the Union’s member countries that posed 
complications for a strong EU foreign policy. As these member countries, especially the three 
major actors in the EU, have their own perspectives on the benefits of Egypt and the Middle 
East, they applied a variety of policy instruments to ensure that while they support the EU, they 
can still achieve their policy interests.  Finally, the effectiveness of EU’s foreign policy is greatly 
affected by the EU’s complex structure and decision-making system because each division 
within the EU has a different sentiment as to how the issue in Egypt can be resolved. While the 
EU does have good intentions in reaching out to the Egyptian government and its citizens, it is 
clear that it cannot fully deliver its initiatives and promises to the people. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, this study aimed to investigate if the EU can promote change in regions 
affected by the Arab Spring and introduce democracy without US involvement or interference. 
This study also aimed to discover if the EU can introduce a more efficient reform program and 
deliver its promises to the people.  
 Similar to the sudden onset of the uprising, the study indicated that the EU has been taken 
off guard with regards to the onset of the Arab Spring in 2010 and was unable to instigate reform 
immediately due to the sheer extent of the entire revolution. In an interview with the EEAS 
Representative Patrice Bergamini, Head of the Middle East, North Africa Division in the EEAS, 
Bergamini stated that the EU’s action towards the Arab Spring should not be criticized so deeply 
because the event itself was difficult to predict and immediately responding to it is difficult due 
to the different countries of the EU. He also stated that “the crisis in both Syria and the Sahel, for 
example, still have unknown variables on how it could affect the entire region’s stability and 
EU’s actions’ effectiveness. The Arab Spring entire impact cannot be determined for another 15 
to 20 years.” Bergamini also expressed that better successes could be reached if the EEAS and 
the European Commission can be improved in terms of their cooperation with one another in 
highlighting key issues in the Mediterranean such as education, human rights and 
development.202 
 With the onset of the Egyptian Arab Spring, the EU still pushed for democratic 
promotion in the country while providing economic aid to ensure that the Egyptian people can 
finally recover from the revolution. The EU has also been able to introduce new initiatives when 
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it comes to the security framework in the region now that terrorism and migration has become a 
concern for many nations. They were also considered key factors to the improvement of civil 
society groups and in promoting negotiations as to how such groups could become more active 
members of the transition process.  
However, while the EU does have strong objectives when it comes to its policies for the 
region, including the promoting of exercising democracy and recovery, it was clear that EU 
policies were greatly influenced by its individual member states, Egypt’s current political status, 
and its structure which affected its effectiveness. The changing political leadership in Egypt and 
their respective interests greatly clashed with the EU, disabling the Union from creating lasting 
partnerships with its leaders. The member countries have also taken several steps outside the EU 
which derailed its influence and the development of strong EU policies towards the region. The 
Member countries also indicated which image the EU should convey to the crisis, further 
complicating policy initiatives. Some member countries even had a passive stance as to how the 
EU should act upon the issue, further affecting the EU’s capacity in introducing reform in the 
unstable country. In the interview with Rania Aurag, Head of Euro- Arab Cooperation division in 
the League of Arab States, she stated that ‘the League would be supportive over the efforts for 
Arab solidarity but it would not become involved unless a state asks them to intervene.’203 
Finally, the complex structure of the EU had hindered the advancement of policies in Egypt 
because of the differing opinions to EU’s overall action in the region and the lack of unanimity.  
 
                                                 
203
 Rania Aurag, interview by Ahmed Adel. (November 10, 2015). 
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Limitations of the Study 
 The study has experienced several limitations that affected the quality and depth of the 
discussions presented in the study. First, there has been a limitation with regards to the primary 
sources which were coming from the Egyptian government whom were at the time, the SCAF 
transition to President Al-Sisi’s government, as they are written in Arabic or only accessible 
through offline means. In this regard, it disabled the researcher to highlight the Egyptian aspect 
of the EU action. The second limitation to this study was with the lack of availability of sources 
that would indicate the responses from other member countries –aside from the three major 
players of the EU – with regards to the Arab and the Egyptian uprising. Finally, it was also a 
challenge for the study to keep up with the conflicting sentiments of experts regarding the total 
impact of the Arab Spring in Egypt; since Egypt remains in a somewhat delicate situation with 
the recent election of President Al-Sisi, it can be said that the total impact of the Arab Spring 
cannot be determined completely at the present time so long as the country remains unstable 
democratically. 
Future Research Direction 
 This study highlighted five major recommendations for future researchers to consider, 
and who wish to continue or further dig deeper into this topic.  
1. Identify other positions of member states regarding where they stand on the Arab Spring 
in Egypt.   
2. Compare Egypt’s situation and EU’s action with other nations affected by the Arab 
Spring such as Tunisia, Syria and Libya.  
3. Study EU-Egyptian Relations under former President Hosni Mubarak.  
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4. Compare EU action in the Egyptian Spring with that of the US or the UN’s actions 
regarding the same issue.  
5. Determine the recommendations of which the EU could implement in order to improve 
its overall foreign policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
Bibliography 
 
Agence France-Press. "EU ponders freeze on Mubarak henchmen's assets." 15 February 2011. Al 
Arabiya News. 12 November 2015. 
<https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/15/137698.html>. 
—. "Protests, mega-deal as Merkel welcomes Egypt's Sisi." 3 June 2015. Daily Mail. 10 
November 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3109489/Merkel-
welcomes-Egypts-al-Sisi-protest-marred-visit.html>. 
Agence France-Presse. "Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to Visit France, Italy in First 
European Trip." 22 November 2014. NDTV. 1 December 2015. 
<http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/egyptian-president-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-to-visit-france-
italy-in-first-european-trip-703015>. 
Ahram Online. "Egypt to see $1bn in Italian investments." 15 September 2012. Ahram Online. 
30 November 2015. 
<http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/52975/Business/Economy/Egypt-to-see-
bn-in-Italian-investments.aspx>. 
Al-Anani, Khalil. Egypt and the EU in the Post-Mubarak Era. Europe in Dialogue 2011/01. 
Berlin: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2011. 
Allam, Ahmad. "Sisi draws regional leaders for inauguration." 9 June 2014. AlMonitor. 1 
December 2015. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/06/egypt-sisi-
inauguration-strong-gulf-support.html>. 
Aswat Masriya. "Sisi says "Egypt" 17 times in first speech as president." 8 June 2014. Aswat 
Masriya. 30 November 2015. 
117 
 
<http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=0e1fb43b-93a0-463d-b2ee-
401e0981263a >. 
Atkinson, Mary. "Egypt asks France to shut down pro-Brotherhood satellite channel ." 13 May 
2015. Middle East Eyes. 12 November 2015. <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-
asks-france-shut-down-pro-brotherhood-satellite-channel-208107289>. 
Ayyad, Mohamed. "Economic Summit to be held from 13-15 March in Sharm El-Sheikh." 22 
November 2014. Daily News Egypt. 25 November 2015. 
<http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/11/22/economic-summit-held-13-15-march-
sharm-el-sheikh/>. 
Bacchi, Umberto. "Sisi UK visit: 'Muslim Brotherhood review ready' David Cameron tells 
Egyptian president." 5 November 2015. International Business Times. 10 November 
2015. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sisi-uk-visit-muslim-brotherhood-review-ready-david-
cameron-tells-egyptian-president-1527423>. 
Balfour, Rosa. Changes and Continuities in EU-Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring. 
Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies; European Policy Centre, 2012. 
—. EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring. Report. Catalonia: European Institute of the 
Mediterranean, 2012. 
Barbe, Esthe and Anna Herranz-Surraelles. The Challenge of Differentiation in Euro-
Mediterranean Relations: Flexible Regional Cooperation of Fragmentation. London: 
Routledge, 2013. 
Bartunek, Robert-Jan. "EU will not monitor Egypt vote after equipment blocked: official." 17 
May 2014. Reuters. 7 November 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/17/us-
egypt-election-eu-idUSBREA4G08C20140517>. 
118 
 
Behr, Timo. After the Revolution: The EU and the Arab Transition. Policy Paper No. 54. Paris: 
Notre Europe, 2012. 
Behr, Timo and Aaretti Siitonen. Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil Society 
Engagement after the Arab Spring. FIIA Working Paper No. 77. Helsinki: Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs, 2013. 
Behr, Timo. Germany and the Arab Spring. Paris: IFRI, 2012. 
—. "The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard 
Change its Spots?" Amsterdam Law Forum 4.2 (2012): 76-88. 
Bindi, Federiga and Irina Angelescu. The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing 
Europe's Role in the World. New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2012. 
Bleich, Erik. "Faith and state. British policy responses to 'Islamist' extremism." Araucaria: 
Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades 16.31 (2014): 127-146. 
Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson and Richard Corbett. The European Union: How does it 
work? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Bremberg, Niklas. "Making sense of the EU's response to the Arab Spring: legitimizing 
discourses and EU foreign policy practices at times of crisis." Change and Continuity in 
Transatlantic Relations Conference. Stockholm: Swedish Network of European Studies 
in Political Science, 2015. 1-27. 
Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler. "A global actor past its peak?" International Relations 
27.3 (2013): 375-390. 
British Parliament; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. British Foreign Policy and 
the 'Arab Spring': Second Report of Session 2012-13. London: The Stationery Office, 
2012. 
119 
 
Brown, Nathan. "Tracking the "Arab Spring": Egypt's Failed Transition." Journal of Democracy 
24.4 (2013): 45-58. 
Central Intelligence Agency. "Egypt." 20 October 2015. The World Facebook. 24 October 2015. 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>. 
Cesari, Jocelyn. "Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority." Haddad-Yazbek, 
Yvonne. Muslims in the West, from Sojouners to Citizens. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002. 36-51. 
Corbett, Richard, John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg. "The EU's institutions." Corbett, 
Richard, John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg. The European Union: How does it work? 
. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 47-73. 
Dalacoura, Katerina. "The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political chance and 
geopolitical implications." International Affairs 88.1 (2012): 63-79. 
de Felice, Damiano. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic 
Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid." World Development 
75 (2015): 26-45. 
de Waele, Henri and Jan-Jaap Kuipers. "The Emerging International Identity of the European 
Union - Some Preliminary Observations." de Waele, Henri and Jan-Jaap Kuipers. 
European Union's Emerging International Identity: Views from the Global Arena. 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013. 1-20. 
Declaration on behalf of the European Union on the oresidential elections in Egypt. Presse 
Release 330; 10649/1/14 REV 1. Brussels: European Union, 2014. 
Delegation of the European Union to Egypt. "Europe mobilizes €272 Million to Egypt at the 
EEDC." 14 March 2015. Delegation of the European Union to Egypt: Press Corner. 30 
120 
 
November 2015. 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/press_corner/all_news/news/2015/20150314_en.
htm>. 
Dempsey, Judy. "Germany Welcomes Egypt's Sisi." 1 June 2015. Carnegie Europe: Strategic 
Europe. 11 November 2015. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=60260>. 
Dias, Vanda Amaro. "A Critical Analysis of the EU's Response to the Arab Spring and its 
Implications for EU Security." Perspectives on European Society and Politics 1 (2014): 
26-61. 
Douglas, Crystal, et al. The Arab Uprisings: Causes, Consequences, and Perspectives. 
Kennesaw: International Conflict Analysis and Transformation, 2014. 
Dunne, Michele and Richard Youngs. Europe and the US in the Middle East: convergence of 
partiality. Policy Brief no. 149. Madrid: FRIDE, 2013. 
"Egypt's President Morsi invited to London by Hague." 11 September 2012. Ahram Online. 10 
November 2015. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/52548.aspx>. 
EUbusiness. "EU calls for swift Egypt elections after Morsi ousted." 4 July 2013. EUbusiness. 
30 November 2015. <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/egypt-politics.por>. 
—. "European Parliament chief urges economic pressure on Egypt." 6 December 2012. 
EUbusiness. 30 November 2015. <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/egypt-
politics.l4h>. 
European Commission. "EU agrees to start trade negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia." 14 December 2011. European Commission Press Release Database. 6 
November 2015. <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1545_en.htm?locale=en>. 
121 
 
—. "EU's response to the "Arab Spring": The State-of-Play after Two Years." 8 February 2013. 
European Commission Press Release Database. 5 October 2015. 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-81_en.htm>. 
—. "The EU's response to the 'Arab Spring'." 16 December 2011. European Commission Press 
Release Database. 5 October 2015. <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-
918_en.htm>. 
European Institute for Research. "EU-Egypt Relations." n.d. European Institute for Research: 
On Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation. 21 October 2015. 
<http://www.medea.be/en/countries/egypt/eu-egypt-relations/>. 
European Parliament. "European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2013 on the situation in 
Egypt." 12 September 2013. European Parliament. 30 November 2014. 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dmed/dv/3a_respe12se
pt2013_sitegypte_/3a_respe12sept2013_sitegypte_en.pdf>. 
European Union Delegation to the United Nations - New York. "EU Council conclusions on 
Egypt." 1 December 2011. European Union Delegation to the United Nations - New 
York. 1 December 2015. <http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11641_en.htm>. 
European Union Delegation to the United Nations -New York. "The EU's response to the 'Arab 
Spring'." 16 December 2011. European Union Delegation to the United Nations -New 
York. 20 November 2015. <http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11717_en.htm>. 
European Union. "Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on 
the election of Mohammed Morsi as the President of Egypt." 24 June 2012. European 
Council: Council of the European Union. 30 November 2015. 
122 
 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/131145.pdf>
. 
Fahsi, Magda. "Egyptian President Morsi in Brussels Seeks to Reassure Europeans." 26 
September 2012. MintPress News. 1 December 2015. 
<http://www.mintpressnews.com/egyptian-president-morsi-in-brussels-seeks-to-reassure-
europeans/37797/>. 
Florensa, Senen. "Union for the Meditterranean: Challenges and Ambitions." IEMED (2010): 58-
67. 
Gardner, Andrew. "EU 'congratulates' el-Sisi." 6 June 2014. Politico. 7 November 2015. 
<http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-congratulates-el-sisi/>. 
Gelvin, James. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010. 
Greco, Kristyn. "The Arab Spring: Where Was the EU, and What is its Future Role in the 
Region?" Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 13.4 (2013): 1-8. 
Guarascio, Francesco. "UPDATE 1- Berlusconi calls Mubarak wise man, urges continuity." 4 
February 2011. Reuters. 7 November 2015. 
<http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFLDE7131GX20110204>. 
Hague, William. "International Policy Responses to Changes in the Arab World." BRISMES 
Annual Conference 2012. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 
2012. 1-6. 
Hamed, Adham. Revolution as a Process: The Case of the Egyptian Uprising. Bremen: Wiener 
Verlag, 2014. 
123 
 
Hollis, Rosemary. "No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 'Arab 
Spring'." International Affairs 88.1 (2012): 81-94. 
Huber, Daniela. "Mixed Signals" Still? The EU's Democracy and Human Rights Policy Since the 
Outbreak of the Arab Spring. IAI Working Papers 12. Rome: Instituto Affari 
Internazionali, 2012. 
i Lecha, Eduard Soler and Irene Garcia. The Union for the Mediterranean: What has it changed 
and what can be changed in the domain of security. INEX Policy Brief. Brussels: Centre 
for European Policy Studies, 2009. 
Iliev, Ivo, et al. European neighborhood policy- a new attitude towards the "Southern 
neighbors". Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012. 
International Crisis Group. Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt's SCAF. Crisis 
Group Middle East/North Africa Report no. 121. New York: International Crisis Group, 
2012. 
Isaac, Sally Khalifa. Europe and the Arab Revolutions: From a Week to a Proactive Response to 
a Changing Neighborhood. KFG Working Paper no. 39. Berlin: Freie Universitat Berlin, 
2011. 
Ishay, Micheline. "The spring of Arab nations? Paths toward democratic transition." Philosophy 
and Social Criticism (2013): 1-11. 
"Islam in Italy." 2015. Euro-Islam: News and Analysis on Islam in Europe and North America. 1 
December 2015. <http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/italy/>. 
Ismail, Mohamed. "Egypt's SCAF chief to visit Italy in June." 22 April 2011. Egyptian Gazette. 
30 November 2015. <http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/?action=news&id=17414>. 
124 
 
"Joint UK-France-Germany statement of Egypt." 29 January 2011. Gov.UK News Stories. 1 
December 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-uk-france-germany-
statement-on-egypt>. 
Kahraman, Sevilay. "The European Neighborhood Policy: The Euroepan Union's New 
Engagement Towards Wider Europe." Perceptions (2005): 1-28. 
Kaunert, Christian and Sarah Leonard. European Security Governance and the European 
Neighborhood After the Lisbon Treaty. London: Routledge, 2013. 
Kern, Soeren. "The Islamization of Germany in 2013." 15 January 2014. Gatestone Institute. 8 
November 2015. <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4130/islamization-germany>. 
Keukeleire, Stephan and Tom Delreux. The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
Khader, Bichara. The European Union and the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty to the Arab 
Spring. Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2013. 
Korteweg, Rem. "Europe's struggle for influence." 23 August 2013. Centre for European 
Reform. 10 November 2015. <http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/europes-struggle-influence-
egypt>. 
Laffan, Brigid and Alexander Stubb. "Member States." Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson and 
Richard Corbett. The European Union: How does it work? Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 74-98. 
Lazarou, Elena, Maria Gianniou and Gerasimos Tsourapas. "The Limits of Norm Promotion: 
The EU in Egypt and Israel/Palestine." Insight Turkey 15.2 (2013): 171-193. 
Lehne, Stefan. The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy. Publication. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2012. 
125 
 
Lloyd, Lindsay. "European approaches to democracy promotion." International Journal (2010): 
547-559. 
Marchi, Ludovica, Richards Whitman and Geofrfrey Edwards. Italy's Foreign Policy in the 
Twenty-First Century: A Contested Nature? London: Routledge, 2014. 
Marks, Jon. "High hopes and low motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative." 
Mediterranean Politics 1.1 (1996): 1-24. 
Martin, Marie. "Extension of Mobility Partnerships with Euro-Mediterranean Partners." 
Panorama (2012): 279-283. 
Middle East Monitor. "Tensions between Sisi and Europe intensify." 29 January 2015. Middle 
East Monitor. 9 November 2015. 
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/16675-tensions-between-sisi-and-
europe-intensify>. 
Mikail, Barah. France and the Arab Spring: an opportunistic quest for influence. Working Paper 
No. 110. Madrid: Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior 
(FRIDE), 2011. 
Pace, Michelle and Peter Seeberg. The European Union's Democratization Agenda in the 
Mediterranean. London: Routledge, 2013. 
Pertusot, Vivien. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue: Europe's Response to the Egyptian Uprising." 27 
May 2011. Carnegie Europe. 10 November 2015. 
<http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=44230>. 
Peters, Joel. The European Union and the Arab Spring: Promoting Democracy and Human 
Rights in the Middle eAST. Lanham: Lexington Book, 2012. 
126 
 
Peterson, John. "The EU as a Global Actor." Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson and Richard 
Corbett. The European Union: How does it work? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012. 203-223. 
Phillips, Leigh. "Mediterranean EU states block stronger action on Tunisia." 14 January 2011. 
EUObserver. 30 November 2015. <https://euobserver.com/foreign/31644>. 
Pollack, Mark, Helen Wallace and Alasdair Young. "Policy-Making in a Time of Crisis: Trends 
and Challenge." Wallace, Helen, Mark Pollack and Alasdair Young. Policy-Making in the 
European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 467-488. 
Reuters. "UPDATE 1-Five EU leaders urge rapid transition in Egypt." 3 February 2011. Reuters. 
30 November 2015. <http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idAFLDE7120UV20110203>. 
Roll, Stephan. Al-Sisi's Development Vision. SWP Comments 26. Berlin: German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs, 2014. 
Saleh, Ashraf. "Egypt and the EU: An Assessment of the Egyptian Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership." Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 15.1 (2013): 39-63. 
"Statement by EU HR Ashton on the situation in Egypt." 18 December 2011. European Union 
Delegation to the United Nations - New York. 8 November 2015. <http://eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11726_en.htm>. 
Stokke, Olav. Aid and Political Conditionality. London: Routledge, 2013. 
Suel, Ash. "From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean." 
Perceptions (2008): 93-121. 
Teti, Andrea. "Democracy without Social Justice: Marginalization of Social and Economic 
Rights in EU Democracy Assistance Policy after the Arab Spring." Middle East Critique 
24.1 (2015): 9-25. 
127 
 
The Carter Center. Presidential Election in Egypt. Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2012. 
Traynor, Ian and John Hooper. "France and Italy in call to close EU borders in wake of Arab 
protests." 27 April 2011. The Guardian. 12 November 2015. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/26/eu-borders-arab-protests>. 
van Hullen, Vera. EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring: International Cooperation 
and Auhoritarianism. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian, 2015. 
Vandenhole, W. Child Soldiers and the EU Policy on Children on Armed Conflict. Brussels: 
TEPSA, 2014. 
Vimont, Pierre. The Path to an Upgraded EU Foreign Policy. Belgium: Carnegie Europe, 2015. 
Virgili, Tommaso. "The "Arab Spring" and the EU's "Democracy Promotion" in Egypt: A 
Missed Appointment?" Perspectives on Federalism 6.3 (2014): 43-75. 
Watson, Rory and Richard Corbett. "How Policies Are Made." Corbett, Richard, John Peterson 
and Elizabeth Bomberg. The European Union: How does it work? . Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 122-140. 
Watt, Nicholas. "David Cameron arrives in Egypt to meet military rulers." 21 February 2011. 
The Guardian. 9 November 2015. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/feb/21/david-cameron-visits-egypt>. 
Wetzel, Anne and Jan Orbie. The EU's Promotion of External Democracy: In search of the plot. 
CEPS Policy Brief No. 281. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012. 
Whitman, Richard and Ana Juncos. "The Arab Spring, the Eurozone crisis and the 
Neighbourhood: A Region in Flux." Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (2012): 147-
161. 
128 
 
Wilga, Maciej and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski. New Approaches to EU Foreign Policy. London: 
Routledge, 2014. 
Wouters, Jan and Sangerijn Duquet. "The Arab Uprisings and the European Union: In Search of 
a Comprehensive Strategy." Yearbook of European Law 32.1 (2013): 230-265. 
Yigit, Nurettin. Arab Spring in Berlin and Paris: German and French Policy Between Continuity 
and Change. Berlin: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2015. 
Youngs, Richard. From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed. Brussels: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014. 
—. The EU and the Arab spring: from munificence to geo-strategy. Policy Brief no. 100. 
Madrid: Fudacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2011. 
“The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third  
Countries” in 2001 (COM (2001) 252). 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical measures to  
accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of 
the Euro-Mediterranean partnership [Official Journal L 189 of 30.07.1996]. 
Council Decision 2012/723/CFSP of 26 November 2012 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP  
concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in 
view of the situation in Egypt, OJ L 327/44, 27 November 2012. 
Declaration on behalf of the European Union on the oresidential elections in Egypt. Presse  
Release 330; 10649/1/14 REV 1, (Brussels: European Union, 2014) 
 
129 
 
 
